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I. INTRODUCTION
Two robbers entered an Alabama restaurant and forced customers and
employees into a walk-in refrigerator at gunpoint.1 Fortunately, one of the
1. See J. Neil Schulman, Op-Ed., A Massacre We Didn’t Hear About: Firearms in the
Hands of Private Citizens Should Play an Important Role in Protection of the Public Safety, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 1992, at B7.
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customers, legally armed with his own pistol, shot the robbers before any
hostage was injured.2 In New York City, a fifty-six year-old woman in a
wheelchair was attacked while leaving her apartment.3 She shot her
attacker, ending the attack, with a loaded gun she was carrying in violation
of local gun-control laws.4 In Texas, a man drove his pickup truck through
the glass doors of a crowded Texas restaurant, pulled out two semiautomatic pistols, and opened fire.5 He continued shooting for ten minutes,
giving hostages ample time to return fire, especially since his pistol
jammed many times.6 But, Texas law forbade private citizens from
carrying firearms out of their homes or businesses, and the restaurant
forbade employees from carrying firearms at work. Twenty-three innocent
people died.7
Gun proponents cite anecdotes like these when arguing for the safety
benefits of firearms and the need for fewer firearm controls. But gun
opponents have their own stories. In Henderson, Kentucky, a plastics plant
worker shot and killed five co-workers before killing himself.8 He became
upset after his supervisor reprimanded him for using a cell phone and
failing to wear safety goggles.9 That supervisor lost his life.10 In New
York, a distraught executive summoned two employees to his office, shot
them to death, and killed himself with a gun he kept nearby.11
Amid this debate, many states have enacted laws to protect individuals’
rights to store guns in their vehicles while at work.12 These laws13 take
2. Id. The protagonist sustained minor injuries from the fire exchange. Id.
3. John R. Lott, Jr., Op-Ed., NY Gun Laws & the Granny, N.Y. POST, Sept. 14, 2006,
available at http://swampman.nypost.com/seven/09142006/postopinion/opedcolumnists/ny_gun_
laws__the_granny_opedcolumnists_john_r__lott_jr_.htm.
4. Id.
5. Schulman, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Bob Driehaus, Worker Kills Five at Plant in Kentucky, Then Himself, N.Y. TIMES, June
26, 2008, at A20.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Insurance Executive Kills Co-Workers, Self, AUGUSTA CHRON. (Georgia), Sept. 17, 2002,
at A2. Two semi-automatic handguns were found on the floor, and a third was found elsewhere in
the office; all three belonged to the gunman. Id.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See CHRIS W. COX, NRA INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION, WORKERS PROTECTION LAWS—2006
(2006), available at http://www.nraila.org/Issues/Articles/Read.aspx?id=181&issue=53 (noting
dueling terminology for these laws); see also ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282,
1286–87 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (noting that proponents and opponents use different terms to describe
these laws), rev’d sub nom. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-5166, 2009 WL 388050 (10th
Cir. Feb. 18, 2009). Proponents call these laws “Workers Protection” laws, while opponents name
them “Forced Entry” laws. This Article adopts the neutral phrase “guns-at-work” laws, a phrase
used by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. See Fla. Retail Fed’n,
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various forms, but all limit an employer’s ability to prevent employees
from storing guns in their vehicles on employer property.14
These laws provide a litmus test for the gun debate. Supporters argue
that such laws are necessary for employee self-defense since many licensed
gun owners store their guns in their cars for protection as they commute
through dangerous neighborhoods.15 According to this position, “[h]ardworking men and women are not immune from criminals in their
employers’ parking lots. Nor are they impervious to carjackers, robbers or
rapists during their commute or as they run errands before or after work.”16
Employees working the graveyard shift deserve a means of self-defense
too.17
Opponents argue these laws instead decrease worker morale and safety
by increasing the proximity to guns that can too easily turn a disagreement
deadly.18 If employees have immediate access to guns, they argue,
supervisors will not feel comfortable disciplining employees for fear of
violent retaliation.19 Moreover, employees will work in fear that a loose
cannon may “go postal.”20
At least two federal district courts have considered the legitimacy of
state guns-at-work laws.21 One found the state laws preempted by the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act),22 which Congress
enacted to promote worker safety.23 According to that court, the state laws
create an obstacle to, and conflict with, the Act and therefore cannot
Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1286 (N.D. Fla. 2008).
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See, e.g., Marion P. Hammer, Op-Ed., Businesses May Not Usurp Constitutional Rights,
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Apr. 1, 2008, at B3.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1334–35; BRIAN J. SIEBEL, BRADY CTR. TO
PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, FORCED ENTRY: THE NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION’S CAMPAIGN TO FORCE
BUSINESSES
TO
ACCEPT
GUNS
AT
WORK
6–12
(2005),
available
at
http://www.bradycampaign.org/xshare/pdf/forced-entry-report.pdf.
19. This concern is not without support when a supervisor loses his life simply for
disciplining an employee about protecting his eyes with safety goggles. See supra text
accompanying notes 8–10.
20. See SIEBEL, supra note 18, at 6–8, 11–12.
21. See Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1286 (N.D. Fla. 2008);
ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1286–87, 1296, 1330, 1340 (N.D. Okla. 2007), rev’d sub nom.
Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-5166, 2009 WL 388050 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 2009).
22. See ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1286–87, 1296, 1330–40 (N.D. Okla. 2007)
(holding that the OSH Act preempts Oklahoma’s version of these laws and enjoining enforcement
insofar as they conflict with the OSH Act), rev’d sub nom. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, No. 075166, 2009 WL 388050 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 2009) .
23. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2006)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 651.
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stand.24 Another court disagreed, finding an express provision in the Act
permits states to regulate in this area.25
This Article discusses whether the OSH Act preempts such laws and
concludes it does not.26 Part II provides an overview of the law necessary
24. ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1330–40.
25. See Fla. Retail, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1298. The court did not discuss whether Florida’s law
creates a conflict with the OSH Act. See id. Instead, the court found § 667(a) of the Act applied to
expressly prevent preemption. Id.
The Supreme Court’s first Second Amendment case in nearly seventy years, District of
Columbia v. Heller, adds more fuel to the debate. See Kenneth A. Klukowski, Note, Armed by
Right: The Emerging Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J.
167, 170–71 (2008) (noting that, before Heller, the Supreme Court had only made one significant
statement about the Second Amendment in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)). In Heller,
the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment embodies an individual’s right to keep and
bear arms for self- defense. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799, 2801, 2817–18
(2008) (“[T]he inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment right,” and
“[t]here seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment
conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.”). Laws violating this right—for instance, by
completely banning handguns in homes—may not survive judicial scrutiny. See id. at 2817–18
(finding handgun ban is unconstitutional and invalid).
The scope of Heller is uncertain. Because Heller involved the District of Columbia, id. at 2787–
88, it is not yet settled whether the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller will be
incorporated to apply against the states. See id. at 2812–13 & n.23; see also Klukowski, supra, at
189–90 (noting Heller did not consider whether the Second Amendment is incorporated to apply
against the states). Of course, even if the Second Amendment ultimately applies to the states, it will
not directly apply to private employers. See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.6(a) (4th ed. 2007) (noting that the
first ten amendments to the Bill of Rights directly apply only to the federal government).
Further, in Heller, the Court did not consider the precise issue of carrying a gun at all times.
Heller is limited to guns in the home for self-defense. 128 S. Ct. at 2817–22. It is not yet clear
whether the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to store her gun in her car. Though
Heller does not address guns in vehicles, it suggests the stakes in this debate are high if individuals’
constitutional rights potentially hang in the balance. See generally 128 S. Ct. at 2783. It is also not
difficult to imagine that courts may quickly extend Heller to vehicles.
26. See infra Part V. As states are enacting these statutes, the Supreme Court’s preemption
jurisprudence has perhaps signaled a trend of receptivity toward preemption. See, e.g., Chamber of
Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2412 (2008) (finding that the National Labor Relations Act
preempts California law where California law regulates within a zone protected and reserved for
market freedom); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1002–07 (2008) (holding preemption
clause in Medical Device Amendments of 1976 bars state tort claims challenging safety and
effectiveness of medical devices that have been pre-approved by the Food and Drug
Administration); Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 128 S. Ct. 989, 998 (2008) (finding federal
law preempts two provisions of Maine law, which regulate tobacco delivery); Preston v. Ferrer, 128
S. Ct. 978, 981 (2008) (holding when parties agree to arbitrate all questions arising under a
contract, the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state laws lodging primary jurisdiction in another
forum). Bucking this trend, the Supreme Court held on March 4, 2009, that FDA labeling
requirements did not preempt state-law failure-to-warn claims in a products-liability case. See
Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249, 2009 WL 529172 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2009). It is difficult to extrapolate
from these preemption cases that do not involve the OSH Act to the issue under consideration here
because preemption analysis turns primarily on the statute at issue. See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &
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to navigate any preemption problem. Part III analyzes the OSH Act and its
specific provisions. Part IV examines state guns-at-work laws, reveals
characteristics that many of these laws share, and addresses lower court
cases that have considered OSH Act preemption of these laws. Part V
argues that these laws do not conflict with the OSH Act. Finally, Part VI
contends that preemption requires promulgation of standards in accordance
with the OSH Act, and absent standards, states remain free to regulate in
this arena. This dispute over workers’ safety and gun-owners’ rights must
be resolved by the executive branch in accordance with the OSH Act,
rather than by the courts through the doctrine of preemption.27
II. PREEMPTION PRIMER
Though states are independent sovereigns, the United States
Constitution provides that federal law is supreme and contrary state law
must yield.28 This federal supremacy creates the backdrop for the doctrine
of preemption.29
A. Important Background Principles to Guide Preemption
Analysis
Two important principles guide the analysis to determine whether
preemption applies. First, congressional intent is of paramount importance.
Second, courts often apply a presumption against preemption in
traditionally state-controlled arenas.
1. Congressional Intent as Lodestar
The ultimate task in any preemption analysis is clear: determine
whether state law is consistent with the structure and purpose of the federal
law as a whole.30 This inquiry uses the federal law’s objectives and
policies for guidance.31 Congress enacts federal law, and has the power,
stemming from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,32 to preempt
JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 12.1 (4th ed.
2007).
27. Despite clear constitutional underpinnings, considerable confusion has emerged over the
scope and application of preemption and whether certain state laws must yield to federal law. See
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540–41 (2001).
28. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.; ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 26, §12.1.
29. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 26, §12.1.
30. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (plurality opinion). Part
II of Gade received only a plurality of the Court. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 91. Unless otherwise
indicated, citation to Gade is to the majority portions of the opinion.
31. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987).
32. The Supremacy Clause reads:
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state law.33 Congressional intent is therefore the lodestar for determining
whether state law is preempted.34
Courts discern this congressional intent from the statutory language and
overall framework of the federal law.35 “The nature of the power exerted
by Congress, the object sought to be attained, and the character of the
obligations imposed by the law, are all important in considering the
question of whether supreme federal enactments preclude enforcement of
state laws on the same subject.”36 Courts analyze congressional intent
against a backdrop presumption that Congress does not cavalierly preempt
state law.37

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
33. “‘It is of the very essence of supremacy, to remove all obstacles to its action within its
own sphere, and so to modify every power vested in subordinate governments.’” Lorillard Tobacco
Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540 (2001) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
427 (1819)); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000); English v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990). Both federal statutes and regulations can preempt state law.
Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985). Even a compelling
state interest cannot save a preempted state law. Gade, 505 U.S. at 108. “[A]ny state law, however
clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law,
must yield.” Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
1, 82 (1824)).
34. See English, 496 U.S. at 78–79. Congress’ purpose has been termed the “touchstone” of
the preemption analysis. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). Only portions of
Medtronic garnered a majority of the Court. Unless otherwise indicated, citation is to the majority
opinion.
Whether the federal agency that enforces the federal law believes there is preemption is also
considered in the analysis. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 67–68 (2002); see also
Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 721 (explaining where Congress has delegated to an agency
administration of a federal program, and the agency has not suggested interference with federal
goals, the Court is reluctant to find preemption). But see Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S.
861, 884–85 (2000) (cautioning that no formal agency statement of preemptive intent is necessary
before finding conflict preemption).
35. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 486.
36. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 70 (1941).
37. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005); Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485.
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2. Presumption Against Preemption
Particularly in areas of law that states have traditionally controlled,38
preemption analysis begins with an assumption that the historic police
powers of the state39 stand undisturbed absent evidence of a clear and
manifest congressional purpose to supersede them.40 This “presumption
against pre-emption”41 stems from notions of federalism and respect for
state sovereignty.42
The Supreme Court has not always applied this presumption
consistently.43 Thus, though it clearly exists, it is unclear exactly how the
presumption applies in practice.44 At a minimum, this presumption should
provide a moment of pause before a court holds that federal law preempts
state law enacted pursuant to state police powers, and it should require that
Congress speak clearly when it intends to preempt in areas traditionally left
to the states.45 When adjudicating cases involving state-controlled arenas,46
38. Crime prevention is one such area. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618
(2000) (“Indeed, we can think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied
the National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and
vindication of its victims.”).
39. State police powers extend to the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. Lohr, 518 U.S.
at 485.
40. Id.; see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001).
41. This presumption applies even where state authority allegedly conflicts with federal
authority. See New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 17–18 (2002); see also
Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 95 P.3d 422, 430 n.12 (Cal. 2004) (rejecting argument that presumption
against preemption should not apply to implied preemption cases).
When states regulate in areas with a history of significant federal presence, however, there is no
presumption against preemption. See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000). Similarly,
where a federal agency is acting within its congressionally delegated authority to preempt state law,
there is no presumption against preemption. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 18. In
this case, the question is simply whether Congress has conferred the power to preempt on the
agency. Id. A federal agency acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority may
preempt state law. Locke, 529 U.S. at 110.
42. See Bates, 544 U.S. at 449; Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485.
43. Compare, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 668 (1993) (purporting to
apply presumption), Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (same), with Norfolk S. RR
v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000) (failing to mention or apply presumption), and Geier v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (same). See Richard C. Ausness, Preemption of State Tort
Law by Federal Safety Statutes: Supreme Court Preemption Jurisprudence Since Cipollone, 92 KY.
L.J. 913, 967 (2003–2004) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence and noting
that “[d]uring the past decade, the Court has referred to the presumption against preemption in
some cases and ignored it completely in others”).
44. See Ausness, supra note 43, at 972–73 (discussing the Supreme Court’s inconsistent
treatment of the presumption against preemption).
45. Id. at 973 (arguing the presumption should act as a “clear statement rule,” requiring
Congress to state expressly its intent to preempt, and any statutory ambiguity should militate against
preemption); cf. Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 543 (2002) (explaining
that when Congress intends to alter the balance between the states and federal government by
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courts should not find for preemption of state law where Congress has not
clearly communicated that federal law preempts.
B. Types of Preemption
Preemption generally takes two forms: express and implied.47 Implied
preemption is further subdivided into field and conflict preemption.48
These categories are not rigidly distinct.49
1. Express Preemption
Express preemption is straightforward.50 It exists where Congress has
shown its intent to preempt state law through explicit statutory language.51
An express preemption clause generally begins preemption analysis
because it is the best indicator of Congress’ intent.52 When Congress has
made its intent known through explicit statutory language, the preemption
task simply gives effect to that language.53
2. Implied Preemption
A federal law lacking an express-preemption provision may still
preempt state law. Similarly, a federal law with an express-preemption
provision that does not apply to the state law in question may still preempt
that law.54 In both cases, this preemption occurs through implied

preempting the historic powers of states or by legislating in traditionally sensitive areas that affect
the federalism balance, Congress must make its intentions “unmistakably clear in the language of
the statute” (citation omitted)).
46. See supra notes 38–39.
47. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 884 (2000) (stating that the Court has
traditionally distinguished between express and implied preemption); English v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990).
48. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 n.6 (2000) (stating that
field preemption may fall into the implied-preemption category); Geier, 529 U.S. at 884 (noting
that the Court typically treats conflict preemption as a species of implied preemption); English, 496
U.S. at 79 (explaining that field and conflict preemption apply in the absence of express statutory
language).
49. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373 n.6. For example, a state law that regulates in a preempted field
may be said to conflict with Congress’ intent. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S.
88, 104 n.2 (1992) (plurality opinion). Thus, that state law could be considered a species of field or
conflict preemption. Id.
50. See English, 496 U.S. at 78.
51. Id. at 79; see also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1002–07 (2008) (interpreting
the express preemption provision in the Medical Device Act); Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 541
(stating that express language in a congressional enactment may foreclose state action).
52. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62–63 (2002).
53. See State ex rel. Stenehjem v. FreeEats.com, Inc., 712 N.W.2d 828, 841 (N.D. 2006).
54. See infra note 248.
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preemption.55 Implied preemption may be either field or conflict
preemption.56
a. Field Preemption
Congress may intend that federal law “occup[ies] the field” and governs
the conduct exclusively,57 an arrangement called “field preemption.”58
Field preemption applies when there is a “‘field reserved for federal
regulation’ and ‘Congress ha[s] left no room for state regulation of these
matters.’”59 It is inferred where the federal interest is so dominant that it is
presumed to preclude state laws on the subject.60 Field preemption stems
from the depth and breadth of the congressional scheme that occupies the
legislative field,61 and it depends on the intent behind the federal scheme62
The Supreme Court has limited application of field preemption,
especially where state law governs health and safety.63 In arenas
traditionally within the federal government’s purview, like foreign affairs,
however, the Court is more likely to find field preemption.64
55. Id.
56. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
57. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000); see also English v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). “It is not always a sufficient answer to a claim of preemption to say that state rules supplement, or even mirror, federal requirements.” United States v.
Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 115 (2000). Rather, “[t]he appropriate inquiry still remains whether the
purposes and objectives of the federal statutes, including the intent to establish a workable, uniform
system, are consistent with concurrent state regulation.” Id.
58. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372–73; English, 496 U.S. at 79.
59. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 69 (2002) (quoting Locke, 529 U.S. at 111).
60. Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985).
61. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001).
62. See Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 714.
63. See, e.g., Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 69 (declining to find field preemption where statute did
not require the Coast Guard to promulgate “comprehensive regulations covering every aspect of
recreational boat safety and design”; nor did statute require Coast Guard to certify acceptability of
“every” recreational boat within its jurisdiction); see also Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 720
(explaining even a national policy may not remove a regulation from the area of health and safety
and convert it to one of overriding national concern warranting preemption).
The Court is even more reluctant to infer preemption simply from the comprehensiveness of
agency regulations. See Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 720. Instead, it has looked for a specific
statement of preemptive intent. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 884 (2000).
This observation is particularly true for health and safety regulation: “Given the presumption that
state and local regulation related to matters of health and safety can normally coexist with federal
regulations, [the Court] will seldom infer, solely from the comprehensiveness of federal regulations,
an intent to pre-empt in its entirety a field related to health and safety.” Hillsborough County, 471
U.S. at 718 (explaining complex problems will often require intricate and complex congressional
solutions without Congress intending to preempt the field).
64. See Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 719 (explaining that federal interest in foreign
affairs stems from the Constitution and is “‘intimately blended and intertwined with responsibilities
of the national government’” (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941))).
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b. Conflict Preemption
Preemption may also occur impliedly through conflict preemption.65
Conflict preemption exists where it is impossible to comply
simultaneously with state and federal law, or where state law “‘stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and
objectives of Congress.’”66 These types of preemption are “impossibility”
preemption and “obstacle” preemption, respectively.67
i. Impossibility Conflict Preemption
Impossibility conflict preemption is exactly as it sounds: if it is
impossible simultaneously to comply with both state and federal law, state
law yields.68 “For conflict preemption based on impossibility, the question
is whether [state law] is explicitly inconsistent with the federal law, not
whether state law interferes with some purpose of the federal law.”69 The
Supreme Court describes the impossibility as a “physical impossibility.”70
ii. Obstacle Conflict Preemption
Obstacle conflict preemption is less straightforward, and it has created
much debate.71 In determining whether a state law is a sufficient obstacle,
courts examine the federal statute as a whole to discern its purpose and
intended effects.72 “If the purpose of the act cannot otherwise be
65. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 884; Oxygenated Fuels Ass’n, Inc. v. Pataki, 158 F. Supp. 2d 248,
253 n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
66. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–73 (2000) (citation omitted).
Conflict preemption turns on an actual conflict rather than an express statement of congressional
intent. Geier, 529 U.S. at 884. Though clear evidence of a conflict is required, no formal
congressional or agency statement identifying a conflict is necessary. Id. at 884–85.
67. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 228 (2000); Jeffrey A. Berger, Comment,
Phoenix Grounded: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Changing Preemption Doctrine on State
and Local Impediments to Airport Expansion, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 941, 951 (2003).
68. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372.
69. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 457 F. Supp. 2d 324, 331 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
70. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 844 (1997) (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes
Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (plurality opinion)). An example of where it would be
impossible to comply with both federal and state law is if a federal law forbade avocados testing
more than seven percent oil, but state law forbade any avocados testing less than eight percent oil.
See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963).
71. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 67, at 265 (criticizing obstacle preemption as having no
place as a constitutional law doctrine); Berger, supra note 67, at 951–52 (stating that academic
battles have raged over obstacle preemption); Kathryn E. Picanso, Note, Protecting Information
Security Under a Uniform Data Breach Notification Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 371 (2006)
(noting that obstacle preemption has been criticized as a default doctrine used when congressional
intent is unclear).
72. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373.
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accomplished—if its operation within its chosen field else must be
frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural effect—the state law
must yield to the regulation of Congress within the sphere of its delegated
power.”73 Where this happens, state law creates an obstacle to, and
conflicts with, federal law.74 In the face of such conflict, federal law
preempts state law.
C. Effect of Savings Clauses
Congress seldom intends to preempt entire fields of state regulation.75
Indeed, Congress commonly includes a “savings clause” in its legislation.76
A savings clause is a provision that legitimizes concomitant state
regulation.77 If a savings clause exists and applies, it may save state law
from federal preemption.78
The federal law is therefore the appropriate starting point to determine
whether Congress has clearly communicated intent to preempt state law.79
This Article therefore turns to the OSH Act.
III. THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970
The OSH Act brought the federal government into an area traditionally
within the states’ purview.80 Congress enacted the Act to assure “safe and
healthful working conditions”81 to every man and woman in the nation.82
73. Id. The Court places some weight on an agency’s opinion of whether the state law stands
as an obstacle. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 68 (2002); Geier v. Am. Honda
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000).
74. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373.
75. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 26, § 12.1.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Massachusetts, 493 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that
savings clauses at issue save state law from preemption); Lindsey v. Caterpillar, Inc., 480 F.3d 202,
209 (3d Cir. 2007) (construing savings clause and finding it saves state law from preemption). But
see Geier, 529 U.S. at 869 (concluding savings clause does not bar conflict preemption).
79. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (“Since pre-emption claims turn on Congress’s intent, we begin as we do in
any exercise of statutory construction with the text of the provision in question, and move on, as
need be, to the structure and purpose of the Act in which it occurs.” (citations omitted)); see also
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 542 (2001); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,
484–85 (1996).
80. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992) (plurality opinion).
81. The circuits define “working conditions” slightly differently. Compare Oil, Chem. &
Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (defining
“working conditions” as the environmental area in which employees customarily go about their
daily tasks), and Columbia Gas of Penn., Inc. v. Marshall, 636 F.2d 913, 916 (3d Cir. 1980) (same),
and S. Ry. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 539 F.2d 335, 339 (4th Cir.
1976) (same), with S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 1976) (explaining that
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The Act effectuates its purpose by imposing important obligations on
employers.83 Two relevant obligations are compliance with occupational
health and safety standards promulgated under the Act, and compliance
with the Act’s general duty clause.84 Though the Act imposes important
duties, it simultaneously recognizes that ensuring worker safety is not
solely a job for the federal government, and it provides for a system of
cooperative federalism.85
A. Employer Obligations: Standards and the General Duty
Clause
The OSH Act imposes two primary obligations on employers relevant
to the guns-at-work debate. First, it requires employers to comply with the
occupational health and safety standards promulgated pursuant to the
statute.86 Second, it imposes on every employer a general duty to “furnish
to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which
are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause
death or serious physical harm to his employees.”87 This second obligation,
known as the “general duty clause,”88 creates an independent, mandatory
“working conditions” embraces both surroundings, such as the problem of toxic liquid use, and
physical hazards, “which can be expressed as a location (maintenance shop), a category
(machinery), or a specific item (furnace)”). These definitions are actually similar in substance. See,
e.g., Am. Cyanamid, 741 F.2d at 448 (explaining that the aggregate of hazards and surroundings
undergirds the definition of “working conditions” as the environmental area in which employees
customarily perform their daily tasks). The Secretary of Labor has maintained that “working
conditions” includes both the environment and discrete hazards of the job. See Herman v.
Tidewater Pac., Inc., 160 F.3d 1239, 1245 (9th Cir. 1998).
82. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b); see also Am. Smelting & Refining Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm’n, 501 F.2d 504, 505 (8th Cir. 1974) (“The [OSH] Act’s general purpose and
its ‘general duty’ clause evidence a clear Congressional purpose to provide employees a safe and
nonhazardous environment in which business, including commercial and industrial, operations, is
to be conducted.” (footnote omitted)).
83. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651(b)(3), 654(a).
84. See discussion infra Part III.A.
85. “[W]here Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce
Clause, [the Supreme Court has] recognized Congress’ power to offer States the choice of
regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal
regulation.” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992). This has been termed
cooperative federalism. Id.; see infra Part III.B.
86. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651(b)(3), 654(a)(2).
87. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1). “Congress conceived of occupational hazards in terms of
processes and materials which cause injury or disease by operating directly upon employees as they
engage in work or work-related activities.” Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). Examples of
the hazards contemplated are air pollutants, industrial poisons, combustibles, explosives, unsafe
work practices, and inadequate training. Id.
88. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1980) (characterizing § 654(a)(1) as
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requirement for employers distinct from any specific health and safety
standards.89 Even if no specific standards exist, employers may still face
liability for a general-duty-clause violation.90
1. Promulgating Standards
The OSH Act sets forth an intricate scheme for promulgating
standards.91 This process includes a conference with an advisory
committee, publication of the proposed rule with a set period of time for
notice, comments, objections, and an opportunity for hearing.92 Only after
the procedures are satisfied may the Secretary of Labor issue a rule
promulgating, modifying, or revoking a standard.93 This produces
informed decision-making by involving all interested parties in developing
fair standards, and it provides employers with advanced notice of conduct
the government considers safe as well as conduct that will result in
citation.94 The spirit of the Act is to regulate employer conduct through this
predictable system, rather than by ad hoc decision-making.95 Though the
the OSH Act’s general duty clause).
89. Marshall, 445 U.S. at 12–13; see also Safeway, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm’n, 382 F.3d 1189, 1194 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Therefore, the plain language of the
statute and its structure indicate that an employer’s duty to provide a safe working environment
extends beyond compliance with specific safety and health standards that are included in
regulations promulgated under the act.”); Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement
Workers of Am. v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. Div., 815 F.2d 1570, 1575 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Section
5(a)(1) clearly and unambiguously imposes on an employer a general duty to provide for the safety
of his employees that is distinct and separate from the employer's duty, under section 5(a)(2), to
comply with administrative safety standards promulgated under section 6 of the Act.”).
90. See Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1017 n.9 (7th Cir. 1975); see
also 29 U.S.C. § 666(a)–(c) (providing liability for violations of § 654, which encompasses the
general duty clause, or for violations of any standard promulgated under § 655); In re
Establishment Inspection of the Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 13 F.3d 1160, 1167 (7th Cir. 1994).
Civil penalties for “serious violation[s]” are mandatory. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(b). An employer may
receive enhanced fines of up to $70,000 for willful violations of the general duty clause. See id.
§ 666(a). A willful violation may occur the first time an employer violates the general duty clause.
See Ensign-Bickford Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 717 F.2d 1419, 1422–
23 (D.C. Cir. 1983). All that is required for liability is that an employer demonstrates plain
indifference towards the safety requirements of the general duty clause. Id.
91. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b).
92. Id. § 655(b)(1)–(3).
93. Id. § 655(b)(4).
94. See Am. Smelting & Refining Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 501
F.2d 504, 512 (8th Cir. 1974).
95. See S. REP. NO. 91-1282, at 5186 (1970) (“The general duty clause in this bill would not
be a general substitute for reliance on standards, but would simply enable the Secretary to insure the
protection of employees who are working under special circumstances for which no standard has
yet been adopted.”); Am. Smelting & Refining, 501 F.2d at 511–12 (noting a similar argument made
in dissent by Chairman Moran of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission). The
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OSH Act requires employers to comply with both specific standards and
the general duty clause, the general duty clause cannot substitute for
appropriate standards. No federal standards have been promulgated to
address guns in vehicles at the workplace.96
2. The General Duty Clause
The general duty clause traditionally addresses hazards arising from
some condition inherent in the workplace environment.97 The standards for
establishing a general-duty-clause violation are “exacting.”98 The Secretary
must prove that (1) the employer failed to render his workplace free of a
hazard, which was recognized99 as a hazard either by the employer100 or
generally within the industry;101 (2) the hazard caused or was likely to
cause death or serious bodily harm; and, (3) feasible102 means existed to
eliminate or materially reduce the hazard.103
American Smelting court ultimately declined to adopt the chairman’s opinion as applied in this
case, explaining that “the general duty clause should be available at least under the facts of this case
in which a specific standard was under review and in which the Petitioner was allegedly violating a
health standard that had been recognized nationally for many years;” but it found the chairman’s
position generally sound. Id. at 512.
96. See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
97. Megawest Fin., Inc., Dec. & Orders Occ. Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n No. 93-2879,
1995 OSAHRC LEXIS 80, at *24 (May 8, 1995). Some courts have found employers owe this
general duty regardless of whether the employer controls the workplace, is responsible for the
hazard, or has the best opportunity to abate it. Teal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d
799, 804 (6th Cir. 1984); see also United States v. Pitt-Des Moines, Inc., 168 F.3d 976, 982 (7th
Cir. 1999) (“This duty is considered general because it asks employers to protect employees from
all kinds of serious hazards, regardless of the source.”); Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co., Inc. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting
that employer has duty to prevent hazardous conduct by employees); cf. Brennan v. Butler Lime &
Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1975) (“[I]f an employee is negligent or creates a
violation of a safety standard, that does not necessarily prevent the employer from being held
responsible for the violation.”). At least one court has found the general duty clause does not apply
to a policy, though it applies to a physical condition of the workplace. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic
Workers Int’l Union v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
98. Baroid Div. of NL Indus., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 660
F.2d 439, 444 (10th Cir. 1981).
99. A “recognized” hazard is one that is known as a hazard within the particular industry.
Nat’l Realty & Constr., 489 F.2d at 1265 n.32. Unpreventable instances of hazardous conduct are
not “recognized.” Id. at 1266.
100. Proof of an employer’s actual knowledge of a hazard is sufficient to prove it was
“recognized,” but the Secretary has the burden of showing the employer’s safety precautions were
unacceptable in the industry. Magma Copper Co. v. Marshall, 608 F.2d 373, 376–77 (9th Cir.
1979).
101. See Pratt & Whitney Aircraft v. Sec’y of Labor, 649 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1981).
102. “Feasible” means capable of being done, executed, or effected. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst.,
Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 508–09 (1981).
103. See Fabi Const. Co., Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor, 508 F.3d 1077, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2007);
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The general duty clause does not impose on employers an absolute duty
to make the work environment safe.104 Courts hold that employers do not
face liability under the general duty clause unless abatement of the hazard
was possible.105 The government bears the burden of specifying the
particular steps an employer must take to avoid a citation for violating the
general duty clause.106 The government must also demonstrate the
feasibility and likely utility of alternative measures.107
Courts consistently hold that because the general duty clause is a tool of
last resort, standards are the preferred enforcement mechanism.108 If a
specific hazard is a concern, a standard should address it, rather than
relying on the general duty clause.109
Safeway, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 382 F.3d 1189, 1195 (10th Cir.
2004); Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1017–18 & n.9 (7th Cir. 1975). “In
other words, ‘the Secretary must prove that a reasonably prudent employer familiar with the
circumstances of the industry would have protected against the hazard in the manner specified by
the Secretary's citation.’” Fabi Const., 508 F.3d at 1081 (quoting L.R. Willson & Sons, Inc. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 698 F.2d 507, 513 (D.C. Cir.1983)).
104. Baroid Div. of NL Indus., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 660
F.2d 439, 446–47 (10th Cir. 1981); see also Ries v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 960 F.2d 1156,
1160 (3d Cir. 1992) (collecting and citing supporting cases).
105. See Teal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d 799, 804 n.7 (6th Cir. 1984);
Titanium Metals Corp. of Am. v. Usery, 579 F.2d 536, 543–44 (9th Cir. 1978); Brennan v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 502 F.2d 946, 951 (3d Cir. 1974) (explaining that
duty must be capable of achievement); see also Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety
& Health Review Comm’n, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265–66 & n.35 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting Congress did
not intend the general duty clause to impose strict liability; rather the duty was to be an obligation
capable of achievement).
106. See Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n,
601 F.2d 717, 724 (4th Cir. 1979).
107. See id.; see also Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co., 489 F.2d at 1267–68.
108. See Reich v. Arcadian Corp., 110 F.3d 1192, 1199 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases
in support).
109. See R.L. Sanders Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 620
F.2d 97, 101 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Am. Smelting & Refining Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm’n, 501 F.2d 504, 511–12 (8th Cir. 1974); see also S. REP. NO. 91-1282, at
5186 (1970) (“The general duty clause in this bill would not be a general substitute for reliance on
standards, but would simply enable the Secretary to insure the protection of employees who are
working under special circumstances for which no standard has yet been adopted.”). But see
Puffer’s Hardware, Inc. v. Donovan, 742 F.2d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding that the Secretary did
not abuse his discretion by proceeding under the general duty clause rather than establishing
standards).
R.L. Sanders Roofing Co. should not be read too broadly because it really just illustrates the
need to satisfy the general duty clause requirements before enforcing it. In that case, the Secretary
sought to hold an employer liable under the general duty clause for a hazard that was not
recognized in the industry. R.L. Sanders, 620 F.2d at 101. The court emphasized that where the
government seeks to hold an employer to a stricter standard of safety than customary industry
practice, it must do so through a standard. Id. Thus, the court is essentially finding one of the
elements of the general duty clause (recognized hazard) lacking, which is its basis for declining to
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B. Cooperative Federalism Under the OSH Act
The OSH Act provides a balance for state and federal control over
occupational health and safety. While granting the federal government
wide latitude to establish national standards where necessary, the Act
simultaneously encourages states to assume full responsibility for the
administration and enforcement of their occupational health and safety
laws.110 In this respect, the OSH Act embodies cooperative federalism.111
The Act accomplishes this balance in § 667.112 Section 667(a) provides
that nothing in the Act shall prevent any state agency or court from
asserting jurisdiction under state law over any occupational safety or health
issue where no federal standard is in effect.113 Therefore, where no federal
standard is in place, states may freely regulate over any given occupational
health or safety issue.114
Even where federal standards are in place, states are still not foreclosed
from regulating.115 Where federal standards exist, § 667(b) permits a state
enforce the general duty clause. See id.
110. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(11) (2006).
111. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1992) (providing that the OSH
Act is a program of cooperative federalism); see also Denis Binder, The Spending Clause as a
Positive Source of Environmental Protection: A Primer, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 147, 156–57 & n.80
(2001) (stating that cooperative federalism is where the federal and state governments share
regulatory responsibilities and providing that the OSH Act is a statute subject to cooperative
federalism); Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the Second
Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 469,
553 (1993) (“OSHA’s preemption provisions uniquely establish a system of cooperative
federalism.”); Jose L. Fernandez, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation: Occupational Safety and
Health Act Preemption and State Environmental Regulation, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 75, 97 (1994)
(explaining that through the OSH Act, Congress has contemplated “state participation in achieving
the legislative goal of safe and healthy workplaces for employees”); Robert L. Fischman,
Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 188 (2005)
(noting that the term “cooperative federalism” has been loosely applied to OSHA); Samuel
Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1383
(2006) (characterizing the OSH Act’s objective as “cooperative federalism”); Alan Van Gelder,
Comment, Abolishing the Supervisor Exception to the Independent Employee Action Defense in
Cal-OSHA Cases, 31 SW. U. L. REV. 125, 129 (2001) (acknowledging that the OSH Act was
intended to be an example of cooperative federalism). Where statutes embody cooperative
federalism, the Supreme Court leaves a range of permissible choices to the states. See Wis. Dep’t of
Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 495 (2002).
112. See 29 U.S.C. § 667.
113. 29 U.S.C. § 667(a). The Secretary promulgates standards in accordance with § 655.
Section 655 dictates that the Secretary shall “by rule promulgate as an occupational safety or health
standard any national consensus standard, and any established Federal standard, unless he
determines that the promulgation of such a standard would not result in improved safety or health
for specifically designated employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 655(a).
114. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(a).
115. See id. § 667(b).
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to submit a plan for the development and enforcement of state standards,
and if approved, state standards preempt federal law.116 Absent a state
plan, however, state law is entirely preempted in the face of federal
standards.117 States may not even supplement federal standards,118 since
the Supreme Court has rejected concurrent state and federal jurisdiction
where federal standards exist.119
116. Id. Section 667 sets forth conditions for approval of state plans. See id. § 667(c).
117. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 102 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(“Looking at the provisions of § 18 as a whole, we conclude that the OSH Act precludes any state
regulation of an occupational safety or health issue with respect to which a federal standard has
been established, unless a state plan has been submitted and approved pursuant to § 18(b).”); see
also id. at 111–13 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (agreeing with the plurality, but contending that the
preemption is express, rather than implied).
The Gade plurality and concurrence disagreed over how to categorize this preemption. The
plurality fashioned its holding from implied preemption principles while Justice Kennedy believed
§ 18(b) expressly preempts state law. Compare Gade, 505 U.S. at 98–99, 104 n.2 (plurality
opinion), with id. at 111 (Kennedy, J., concurring). According to the plurality, § 18(b) suggests that
when a federal standard is in effect, non-approved state standards are in conflict with the full
purposes and objectives of the OSH Act, thus conflict preemption is present. See id. at 98–99
(plurality opinion). But see id. at 104 n.2 (acknowledging that the preemption at issue does not fit
neatly into a category and could just as easily be characterized as field preemption). Justice
Kennedy believed the express terms of § 18(b) mandated preemption, thus the preemptive scope of
the OSH Act is limited to the language of the statute. See id. at 111 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
The Gade plurality dismissed the disagreement as labeling, “implied” versus “express,” which is
merely technical. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 104 n.2 (plurality opinion). Though this is generally
correct, there is also a substantive distinction between the plurality and concurrence. Justice
Kennedy would limit the scope of the OSH Act to the text of § 18(b), but the plurality is willing to
look beyond and find implied preemption. Compare id. at 111 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he
pre-emptive scope of the Act is also limited to the language of the statute. When the existence of
pre-emption is evident from the statutory text, our inquiry must begin and end with the statutory
framework itself.”), with id. at 98–99, 104 n.2 (plurality opinion). Per Justice Kennedy’s rationale,
OSH Act preemption is defined by § 18, and if it does not apply, state law is not preempted. See id.
at 114 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy would not look to implied preemption where an
express preemption clause exists but does not govern. See id. at 109–11, 114 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Justice Kennedy’s view has lost. See infra note 250.
118. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 100 (plurality opinion). This is from the portion of Gade receiving
only a plurality; however, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence agrees in substance, making this the
Court’s holding. See id. at 113 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
119. See id. at 102 (plurality opinion); id. at 114 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Pedraza v.
Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 1991) (“At its outer reaches section 18 preemption does not
obtain unless there is an unapproved assertion of jurisdiction under State law over any occupational
safety or health issue as to which a federal standard is already in place.” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added)). According to Gade, the design of the OSH Act
suggests Congress intended only one set of regulations to govern, and a state may only regulate
OSHA-regulated occupational safety and health issues pursuant to an approved state plan that
displaces federal standards. Gade, 505 U.S. at 99 (plurality opinion). All state regulations relating
to an “issue” already addressed by a federal standard are preempted even if they do not conflict with
the federal scheme. Id. at 98–99; see also Indus. Truck Ass’n, Inc. v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1311
(9th Cir. 1997) (“[U]nder the [OSH Act] . . . when OSHA promulgates a federal standard, that
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C. The OSH Act’s Savings Clauses
The OSH Act contains two savings clauses: §§ 4(b)(4) and 18(a).120
Both provisions are discussed here to determine whether either will save
state guns-at-work laws from preemption.
1. Section 4(b)(4)
Section 4(b)(4) is entitled in relevant part “workmen’s compensation
law or common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers
and employees unaffected.”121 It states that nothing in the OSH Act shall
be construed to:
supersede or in any manner affect any workmen’s
compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in any
other manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, or
liabilities of employers and employees under any law with
respect to injuries, diseases, or death122
of employees arising out
of, or in the course of, employment.
standard totally occupies the field within the ‘issue’ of that regulation and preempts all state
occupational safety and health laws relating to that issue, conflicting or not, unless they are
included in the state plan.”).
A state occupational safety and health law is one that directly, substantially, and specifically
regulates occupational safety and health. Gade, 505 U.S. at 107. According to the Act, an
“occupational safety and health standard” is “a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption
or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or
appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 652(8). Any state law designed to promote health and safety in the workplace falls within this
definition, and any state law regulating occupational health and safety is preempted by an OSHA
standard regulating the same subject matter. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 105.
This is true even if the state law serves several objectives. See id. at 106. “That such a law may
also have a nonoccupational impact does not render it any less of an occupational standard for
purposes of pre-emption analysis.” Id. at 107. State laws of general applicability, however (such as
traffic or fire safety laws), that do not conflict with OSHA standards and that regulate conduct of
workers and non-workers alike are generally not preempted. Id. Stated simply, in the absence of the
Secretary’s pre-approval of a state plan, “the OSH Act pre-empts all state law that constitutes, in a
direct, clear and substantial way, regulation of worker health and safety” even if the legislation also
regulates matters outside of worker health and safety. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If a
state wants to enact a dual-impact law that regulates an occupational safety or health issue for which
a federal standard is in effect, it must first submit a plan. Id. at 108.
120. Occupational and Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, §§ 4(b)(4), 18(a),
84 Stat. 1590, 1592–93, 1608 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 653(b)(4), 667(a) (2006)); see
also Gade, 505 U.S. 96–97, 100 (plurality opinion) (explaining that Congress expressly “saved”
some state law from federal preemption in §§ 4(b)(4) and 18(a) and referring to § 18(a) as a “saving
clause”); Pedraza, 942 F.2d at 52–53 (terming § 4(b)(4) the Act’s “savings clause”); Associated
Indus. v. Snow, 898 F.2d 274, 278 (1st Cir. 1990) (describing § 18 as a “savings clause”). The
Pedraza court does not characterize § 18(a) as a “savings clause” but instead describes it as a
general statement of preemptive intent. See Pedraza, 942 F.2d at 51–52.
121. 29 U.S.C. § 653.
122. Id. § 653(b)(4) (emphasis added).
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Sparse legislative history exists for § 4(b)(4).123 The First Circuit
interpreted it very narrowly, finding “the provision [is] merely to ensure
that OSHA [is] not read to create a private right of action for injured
workers which would allow them to bypass the otherwise exclusive
remedy of worker’s compensation.”124 The Third Circuit disagreed,
arguing such an interpretation “defies traditional principles of statutory
interpretation” by ignoring the plain language of § 4(b)(4), which is not
limited only to workers’ compensation but which precludes other matters
expressly identified in the statute.125 The D.C. Circuit has also offered its
own interpretation of § 4(b)(4).126 According to that court, § 4(b)(4) bars
workers from asserting a private cause of action against employers under
OSHA127 standards, and when a worker asserts a claim under state
workmen’s compensation or other law, § 4(b)(4) bars the worker and her
adversary from asserting that the OSH Act preempts any element of state
law.128
2. Section 18(a)
The second savings clause, § 18(a) is straightforward. It expressly
permits states to assert jurisdiction under state law over any occupational
123. See Ries v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 960 F.2d 1156, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1992); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1234 n.70 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
124. See Pratico v. Portland Terminal Co., 783 F.2d 255, 266 (1st Cir. 1985). But see Elliott v.
S.D. Warren Co., 134 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1998) (questioning the continued validity of Pratico).
125. Ries, 960 F.2d at 1161–62; see also Lindsey v. Caterpillar, Inc., 480 F.3d 202, 209 (3d
Cir. 2007) (“We join with those courts whose holdings have formed a solid consensus that [the
savings clause] operates to save state tort rules from preemption.” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)); Pedraza, 942 F.2d at 53 & n.6 (rejecting argument that § 4(b)(4) saves only
worker’s compensation laws and noting “[t]here is a solid consensus that section 4(b)(4) operates to
save state tort rules from preemption”). Courts have also found that § 4(b)(4) saves criminal laws,
see, e.g., People v. Pymm, 563 N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 1990) (finding § 4(b)(4) supports conclusion that
OSH Act does not preempt state criminal laws), and rights granted by statute, see, e.g., Startz v.
Tom Martin Constr. Co., 823 F. Supp. 501, 505–06 (N.D. Ill. 1993). See also Judy K. Broussard,
Note, The Criminal Corporation: Is Ohio Prepared for Corporate Criminal Prosecutions for
Workplace Fatalities?, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 135, 154–56 (1997) (contending that the most
compelling argument against OSH Act preemption of state criminal laws is the language of
§ 4(b)(4) and citing cases finding no preemption of state criminal laws). See generally Note,
Getting Away with Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of State Criminal Prosecutions for
Industrial Accidents, 101 HARV. L. REV. 535 (1987) (arguing OSH Act does not preempt criminal
prosecutions).
126. See Marshall, 647 F.2d at 1235–36.
127. “OSHA is the organization within the Department of Labor that addresses hazards in the
workplace, including workplace violence.” Letter from Richard E. Fairfax, Dir., Directorate of
Enforcement Programs, Occupational Health and Safety Admin., to Morgan Melekos (Sept. 13,
2006), available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTER
PRETATIONS&p_id=25504 (recognizing in a Standard Interpretation letter that no standards
exist).
128. See Marshall, 647 F.2d at 1235–36.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss3/2

20

Royal: Take Your Gun to Work and Leave It in the Parking Lot: Why the OH

2009]

TAKE YOUR GUN TO WORK

495

health or safety issue where no federal standard is in effect.129 In such
instances, resolving the preemption inquiry should be simple: federal law
does not preempt state law. As revealed in Part V.A.2, however, this is not
necessarily true.
IV. GUNS-AT-WORK LAWS
A number of states—including Florida, Georgia, and Oklahoma—have
already enacted guns-at-work laws, and many more have legislation
pending.130 These laws are generally similar, but each has nuances. This
Part highlights the laws in Florida, Georgia, and Oklahoma—important
jurisdictions in the gun debate that provide examples of guns-at-work
laws—and it discusses the guns-at-work laws of other states. It also
identifies noteworthy commonalities of these laws that are relevant to the
preemption inquiry.131 Finally, it considers two recent federal district court
129. 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (2006).
130. The states with legislation pending include Alabama, Arizona, Indiana, Missouri,
Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. See H.R. 362, 2009 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2009) (providing no employer or
other person may establish a policy that restricts the right of a person possessing a firearm stored in
his or her motor vehicle from parking that vehicle in the parking facility while lawfully possessing
the firearm; violation is a misdemeanor, and the violator may also be subject to civil liability); H.R.
2536, 48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2008) (providing employer shall not prevent a person from
transporting, possessing, or storing a gun in a locked motor vehicle parked in employer’s parking
lot, parking garage, or other parking area); S.B. 11, 116th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009)
(prohibiting a natural person, corporation, or governmental entity from enforcing a policy or rule
that prohibits an individual from possessing a firearm locked in the individual’s vehicle while the
vehicle is in or on the person’s property; and authorizing a civil damages action for violations);
H.B. 170, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009) (providing that a business owner shall not
restrict any person from lawfully possessing a firearm in a motor vehicle in possession of such
person except a motor vehicle owned or leased by such business; providing for a civil cause of
action); H.R. 1185, 190th Gen. Assem., 2007–08 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007) (prohibiting employers
from discharging, threatening, or otherwise discriminating or retaliating against an employee
regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment
because the employee exercises “self-defense rights,” which include right to carry firearm in
vehicle, and providing for civil action against violators); H.R. 3063, 105th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess.,
§§ 1, 4 (Tenn. 2007) (providing no person, “including but not limited to an employer,” who is the
owner, lessee, or occupant of property shall prohibit any person who is legally entitled to possess a
firearm from possessing it in a vehicle on property, and providing for civil damages against an
employer who fires, disciplines, demotes, or otherwise punishes an employee for exercising these
rights); S. 2928, 105th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007) (same). For an older Tennessee
guns-at-work bill that never left committee, see S. 153, 105th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn.
2007).
131. This survey does not include every law addressing firearm possession or firearms in
vehicles. It focuses only on laws that have the effect of preventing private employers from
prohibiting employees from storing guns in their vehicles while at work—what this Article has
termed “guns-at-work” laws.
Utah, for instance, has a law that is similar to the guns-at-work laws, but it applies only to local
authorities and state entities. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5a-102(2) (West 2008). It states that unless
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cases that reached opposite conclusions on the precise question considered
here: whether the OSH Act preempts guns-at-work laws.
A. Guns-At-Work Laws132
1. Florida
Florida’s guns-at-work law133 prohibits employers from preventing
customers, employees, or invitees from possessing legally owned firearms
locked in vehicles in parking lots when lawfully in the area.134 Employers
may not stop these individuals from entering parking lots with firearms in
their vehicles so long as the firearms are out of sight within the vehicle.135
Employers may not inquire whether there are firearms in vehicles, nor may
they conduct searches of vehicles.136 Only on-duty law enforcement may
conduct vehicle searches.137
Employers may not take any action against employees, customers, or
invitees based on statements regarding firearms in vehicles.138 Employers
also may not condition employment on an agreement not to maintain such
firearms.139 Nor may they terminate, expel, or otherwise discriminate
against employees, customers, or invitees for exercising these rights (so
long as the firearms are never exhibited on company property for any
reason other than lawful self-defense).140
Florida’s statute completely immunizes employers from civil liability
for actions taken in compliance with the statute.141 It also provides that the
specifically provided by state law, no local authority or state entity may prohibit an individual from
transporting, or keeping a firearm in any vehicle lawfully in the individual's possession or lawfully
under the individual's control. Id. § 53-5a-102(2)(a). It does not, however, prevent private
employers from enacting policies prohibiting weapons in vehicles (as is the case with the guns-atwork laws discussed herein). See Hansen v. Am. Online, Inc., 96 P.3d 950, 954–56 (Utah 2004)
(analyzing UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-98-102, which was subsequently renumbered, effective May 5,
2008, UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5a-102 (2008)).
132. Summaries of the guns-at-work laws with noteworthy aspects of each appear in a chart in
Appendix A. See infra app. A. The chart reveals relevant characteristics of many of the laws that
may prevent conflict with the OSH Act. See id.
133. Preservation and Protection of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms in Motor Vehicles Act of
2008, 2008 Fla. Laws ch. 2008-7, 1–5 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.251 (West
2008), held unconstitutional on other grounds, Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 576 F. Supp.
2d 1301, 1302 (N.D. Fla. 2008)).
134. FLA. STAT. § 790.251(4)(a).
135. Id. § 790.251(4)(d).
136. Id. § 790.251(4)(b).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. § 790.251(4)(c)(2).
140. Id. § 790.251(4)(e).
141. See id. § 790.251(5).
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statute shall not be interpreted to expand any existing duty or create any
additional duty for employers.142
The Florida legislature granted the Florida Attorney General authority
to enforce the statute.143 Nothing in the statute, however, prevents the
aggrieved from suing for violations of rights protected by the statute.144
“[C]ourt[s] shall award all reasonable personal costs and losses suffered,”
and they “shall award all court costs and attorney’s fees to the prevailing
party.”145
The statute contains numerous exceptions.146 It does not apply to
vehicles owned, leased, or rented by employers.147 Nor does it apply to any
property owned or leased by employers (or landlords of employers) upon
which possession of firearms is prohibited pursuant to federal law, by
contract with a federal-government entity, or under the general law of
Florida.148
2. Georgia
Georgia also enacted a guns-at-work law, but it differs from the
others.149 Although it does not expressly ban enacting policies prohibiting
weapons in vehicles, it effectively accomplishes this result.150
Georgia’s law provides that employers shall not establish, maintain, or
enforce any policy or rule that has the effect of allowing employers or their
agents to search locked, privately owned vehicles of employees or invited

142. Id. § 790.251(5)(c). The exact meaning of this provision is unclear and seemingly
paradoxical. The statute clearly creates additional duties for employers. It requires them to permit
various activities on their property that they otherwise might not, and it prevents them from acting
when they otherwise might. See id. § 790.251(4).
143. Id. § 790.251(6). The Attorney General may commence a civil or administrative action to
enforce the statute. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. § 790.251(7).
147. Id. § 790.251(7)(f).
148. Id. § 790.251(7)(g). This provision may be interpreted broadly to prevent conflict with
the OSH Act. If it were determined that the OSH Act required banning guns from vehicles, and an
employer did so to adhere to the OSH Act, this exception suggests that Florida’s guns-at-work law
would not be violated. See id. This result follows because the employer would be acting pursuant to
its OSH Act obligations. Because, in this scenario, possession of firearms would be prohibited
pursuant to federal law, the state-law exception would enable employers to prohibit guns. Thus,
Florida’s guns-at-work law may be interpreted to avoid any OSH Act conflict entirely.
149. See Business Security & Employee Privacy Act, 2008 Ga. Laws 802 (codified at GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-11-135 (West 2008)). This Act was approved May 14, 2008. Id. The law became
effective July 1, 2008. See GA. CODE ANN. § 1-3-4(a)(1). Georgia also has a guns-at-work bill
currently pending before its legislature. See infra note 164.
150. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135.
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guests in employer parking lots.151 Employers also may not condition
employment on any agreement prohibiting prospective employees from
entering parking lots when their vehicles contain firearms locked in trunks,
glove boxes, or other enclosed compartments out of sight—provided the
employee has a Georgia firearms license.152
Like other guns-at-work laws, Georgia’s statute has many
exceptions.153 It excepts searches by certified law enforcement officers
pursuant to valid warrants; searches of vehicles owned or leased by
employers; “any situation in which a reasonable person would believe that
accessing a locked vehicle of an employee is necessary to prevent an
immediate threat to human health, life, or safety;” and searches by licensed
private security officers (with employee consent) for loss prevention based
on probable cause that the employee unlawfully possesses employer
property.154 It does not apply to an employee who is restricted from
possessing a firearm on the premises due to disciplinary action;155 where
state law, federal law, or regulation prohibits transport of a firearm on the
premises;156 and to any area used for parking on a temporary basis.157 As
do many other states, Georgia limits employer liability stemming from
compliance.158
Georgia’s statute contains two interesting provisions. First, it provides
that an employer’s effort to comply with other applicable federal, state, or
local safety laws, regulations, guidelines, or ordinances is a complete
defense to liability.159 Second, it contains a very broad provision that
highlights the narrowness of the statute’s restrictions.160 It provides that
nothing in the statute shall restrict rights of private property owners (or
persons in legal control of property) to control access to their property.161
Even for employers, private property rights govern.162 Because many
employers either own or lease the properties where their businesses
151. See id. § 16-11-135(a).
152. See id. § 16-11-135(b).
153. See id. § 16-11-135(c)–(f), (h), (k).
154. See id. § 16-11-135(c)(1)–(4).
155. See id. § 16-11-135(d)(5).
156. Id. § 16-11-135(d)(6). This could be used to argue Georgia’s statute does not conflict
with the OSH Act. See supra note 148 and accompanying text, and infra notes 188–90 and
accompanying text.
157. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135(d)(8).
158. See id. § 16-11-135(e).
159. See id. § 16-11-135(f). Perhaps even more so than with Florida’s provision, this provision
should eliminate any OSH Act conflict because OSH Act compliance should be a complete defense
to liability under this statute. See id; see also supra note 148 and accompanying text, and infra
notes 188–90 and accompanying text.
160. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135(k).
161. See id.
162. See id.
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operate, private property rights appear to completely negate the statute.163
The Georgia Assembly also has a bill pending that is more similar to
the other states’ guns-at-work laws.164 It prohibits employers from
establishing, maintaining, or enforcing any policy or rule that has the effect
of prohibiting employees from transporting or storing firearms in locked
vehicles in parking areas.165 It contains the usual exceptions, including if
state or federal law prohibits the transport of a firearm on the premises.166
The bill also contains a provision immunizing employers from liability for
compliance.167
3. Oklahoma
Oklahoma has two guns-at-work laws. First, the Oklahoma Firearms
Act of 1971 prohibits:
[Any] person, property owner, tenant, employer, or business
entity [from] maintain[ing], establish[ing], or enforc[ing] any
policy or rule that has the effect of prohibiting any person,
except a convicted felon, from transporting and storing
firearms in a locked motor vehicle, or from transporting and
storing firearms locked in or locked to a motor vehicle on any
property set aside for any motor vehicle.168
Civil action may be brought to enforce this section, and damages,
attorney’s fees, and court costs may be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff.169
The statute immunizes individuals required to permit firearms in vehicles
from civil action for events arising from such firearms unless the
individuals commit crimes involving the firearms.170
163. This subsection is in clear tension with subsection (b), which prevents employers from
conditioning employment (in a sense, access to property) upon agreement that prospective
employees will not enter the parking lot with firearms in vehicles. See id. § 16-11-135(b). Perhaps
this means an employer may not condition employment on an agreement not to bring guns, but once
an employee brings her guns, an employer (who also owns or leases the business property) may
prevent access to the property. This seems like an illogical result if it is in fact what the Georgia
legislature intended.
164. See S. 43, 149th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007–08).
165. See id. § 1(a).
166. See id. § 1(b) (excepting also employers who provide secure parking areas restricting
general access; vehicles owned or leased by employers and used by employees in course of
business; employees who are restricted from carrying or possessing a firearm due to disciplinary
actions; and penal institutions and similar places of detention).
167. Id. § 1(c).
168. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.7a(A) (West 2008).
169. Id. § 1289.7a(C).
170. Id. § 1289.7a(B). This subsection does not apply to claims under the Worker’s
Compensation Act. Id.
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A second Oklahoma statute, entitled “Business owner’s rights,” grants
the right to transport and store firearms in locked vehicles on private
property even when private property owners prefer otherwise.171
4. Other States
Numerous other states have also enacted guns-at-work laws. Many of
these statutes specifically include employers in the class of persons to
whom the laws apply. For example, Kansas’s concealed weapons law
permits employers to restrict the carrying of concealed weapons while on
business premises, but it prevents employers from prohibiting possession
of firearms in private vehicles while parked on employer premises.172
Kentucky has a similar law, which declares that any employer who
punishes an employee for exercising a right guaranteed by Kentucky’s
statute will face civil liability.173 Louisiana has a similar law.174 Like many
of the other states, it contains a clause immunizing those to whom the
statute applies from damages arising from compliance.175 It also contains
an exception common to many of these statutes: it does not apply where
171. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 21, § 1290.22 (West 2008); see also ConocoPhillips Co. v.
Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1286 (N.D. Okla. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v.
Henry, No. 07-5166, 2009 WL 388050 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 2009). Both §§ 1289.7a and 1290.22 are
criminal statutes that subject a violator to misdemeanor sanctions or punishment under Oklahoma
law. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Henry, 110 P.3d 83, 84–86 (Okla. Crim. Appeals 2005). Oklahoma has
expressly declared the right to transport firearms in vehicles. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.7
(“Any person, except a convicted felon, may transport in a motor vehicle a rifle, shotgun or pistol,
open and unloaded, at any time.” (emphasis added)).
172. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c11(a)(1) (2008). That provision provides:
(a) Nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent:
(1) Any public or private employer from restricting or prohibiting by personnel
policies persons licensed under this act from carrying a concealed weapon while
on the premises of the employer’s business or while engaged in the duties of the
person's employment by the employer, except that no employer may prohibit
possession of a firearm in a private means of conveyance, even if parked on the
employer's premises[.]
Id.
173. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.106(1), (4). Kentucky’s Penal Code also contains a guns-atwork provision. See id. § 527.020. It prevents persons or organizations from prohibiting individuals
licensed to carry concealed deadly weapons from possessing them in their vehicle. Id. § 527.020(4),
(8). Any attempt to do so may result in damages or other appropriate relief. Id. Yet another
provision of Kentucky law addresses guns in vehicles. See id. § 237.110(17) (preventing private
employers from prohibiting persons holding weapons licenses from carrying weapons in vehicles).
174. See S.B. 51, 34th Reg. Sess. (La. 2008) (codified at LA REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:292.1
(2008)).
175. Id. § 32:292.1(B).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss3/2

26

Royal: Take Your Gun to Work and Leave It in the Parking Lot: Why the OH

2009]

TAKE YOUR GUN TO WORK

501

state or federal law prohibits the possession of firearms.176
Other state guns-at-work statutes do not specifically reference
employers, but are sufficiently broad to apply to employers. For example,
Alaska’s guns-at-work law forbids any person from prohibiting individuals
from lawfully possessing firearms in vehicles.177 The statute immunizes
individuals from liability for any injury or damage resulting from
compliance with the statute.178 Importantly, the statute does not limit rights
or remedies under other law,179 nor does it apply to individuals who may
not legally possess a firearm under state or federal law.180 181
Minnesota’s guns-at-work law is also broadly worded. Part of the
criminal statutes, it provides that “the owner or operator of a private
establishment may not prohibit the lawful
carry or possession of firearms
in a parking facility or parking area.”182
176. See id. § 32:292.1(D)(1)–(3). This language suggests no OSH-Act conflict. See supra
note 148. Mississippi’s guns-at-work statute is similar to Louisiana’s. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-955 (West 2008). Employers will not face civil liability for damages resulting from occurrences
“involving the transportation, storage, possession or use of a firearm covered by this section.” Id.
§ 45-9-55(5). The statute does not authorize transportation or storage of firearms on any premises
where possession is prohibited by state or federal law. Id. § 45-9-55(4).
177. ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800(a) (2008).
178. Id. § 18.65.800(c).
179. Id. § 18.65.800(b). This provision could be interpreted to avoid any OSH Act conflict. If
the OSH Act grants employees a right to be free from unsafe workplaces with guns in vehicles,
Alaska’s guns-at-work law presumably would not limit this right by compelling employers to permit
guns. See id.
180. Id. § 18.65.800(a). This too may eliminate conflict with the OSH Act. Section
18.65.800(a) only applies to firearm possession by individuals who may legally possess them under
state and federal law. See id. This necessarily means it does not apply to individuals possessing
firearms unlawfully under state or federal law. See id. If it were unlawful under federal OSH Act to
possess firearms in vehicles while at work, this exception arguably would apply. In that case,
employers would argue that the exception is satisfied because employees may not possess firearms
under federal law (at least while on the employer’s property). It is not clear from the language of the
exception whether this argument would succeed. It seems more likely that this exception means if
federal law prevents an individual from possessing a firearm at all, an employer need not permit the
individual to possess the firearm in her vehicle. If, however, the person is permitted under federal
and state law to possess a firearm, § 18.65.800(a) seems to require that she be permitted to
possess/store it in her vehicle. The argument that this provision eliminates an OSH Act conflict is
plausible, however, and no court has held otherwise.
181. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(17)(c) (West 2008), held unconstitutional as applied to
church parking lots in Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194, 206–10, 213
(Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (finding exemption for churches using their property for religious reasons
and basing decision on religious freedom and not property rights or the OSH Act).
182. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(17)(c) (West 2008), held unconstitutional as applied to
church parking lots in Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194, 206–10, 213
(Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (finding exemption for churches using their property for religious reasons
and basing decision on religious freedom and not property rights or the OSH Act). Minnesota’s law
contains another provision that addresses employers specifically. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(18).
It provides that employers and public postsecondary institutions may establish policies restricting
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B. Noteworthy Aspects of the Laws
Although these laws vary, they often have many commonalities. Two
commonalities are relevant here, and both suggest no conflict with the
OSH Act.
First, almost none of the guns-at-work laws target employees
specifically.183 Though the laws apply to employers, very few of the laws
protect only employees.184 The majority apply generally to protect the
public while on property, including business property.185 These are laws
pursuant to state authority over health, safety, and welfare that generally
prevent prohibiting guns in vehicles.186 Essentially, state legislatures have
granted individuals the right to store guns in their vehicles while parked
and conducting business—whether that business is grocery shopping or
working.
As the Supreme Court has explained, however, the critical question for
preemption is not necessarily a state’s intentions in enacting law but rather
the state law’s effect on federal law.187 The effect of guns-at-work laws on
the OSH Act is therefore still important, and is discussed further in Part V.
Second, and more importantly, the majority of guns-at-work laws have
exceptions for federal law. Approximately two-thirds of these laws will not
force individuals to permit firearms if federal law prohibits possessing
firearms.188 If the OSH Act prevents possessing firearms in workplace
carrying firearms, but neither may prohibit lawful carrying or possession in parking facilities or
parking areas. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(18).
183. See infra app A.
184. See infra app A.
185. See infra app A.
186. “Parking-lot laws” rather than “guns-at-work laws may therefore be more appropriate. See
generally Stefanie L. Steines, Parking-Lot Laws: An Assault on Private-Property Rights and
Workplace Safety, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1171 (2008) (terming such laws “parking-lot laws”).
187. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 107 (1992) (“Whatever the
purpose or purposes of the state law, pre-emption analysis cannot ignore the effect of the challenged
state action on the pre-empted field. The key question is thus at what point the state regulation
sufficiently interferes with federal regulation that it should be deemed pre-empted under the [OSH]
Act.”). The Gade Court did point out, however, that generally applicable laws that do not conflict
are generally not preempted, see id. at 107–08, but this does not eliminate the need to determine
whether there is a conflict. As Part V of this Article shows, there is none. See infra Part V.
188. See infra app. A. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800(a)–(b) (2008) (providing it only applies
to individuals who may lawfully possess firearms under state or federal law and stating it does not
limit a person’s rights or remedies under any other law); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.251(7)(g) (West
2008), held unconstitutional on other grounds, Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 576 F. Supp.
2d 1301, 1302 (N.D. Fla. 2008) (excepting property upon which firearm possession is prohibited
pursuant to federal law); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.106(2) (West 2008) (permitting a person,
including an employer, to prevent an individual from possessing a firearm on the property where
that individual is prohibited by federal law from possessing a firearm); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 32:292.1(D)(1) (2008) (providing the section shall not apply to any property where possession of
firearms is prohibited by state or federal law); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-55(4) (West 2008) (stating

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss3/2

28

Royal: Take Your Gun to Work and Leave It in the Parking Lot: Why the OH

2009]

TAKE YOUR GUN TO WORK

503

parking lots because it creates a safety hazard to employees, then these
state statutes would not force employers to permit them.189 For those gunsat-work laws that expressly yield to federal law, there can be no conflict
with federal law.190 In instances where the OSH Act prevents guns in
vehicles, guns-at-work laws in approximately two-thirds of the states
appear expressly to yield, leaving only three states with laws potentially
conflicting with the OSH Act.191
C. Cases Analyzing OSH Act Preemption of
State Guns-at-Work Laws
Florida and Oklahoma federal district courts have analyzed the state
guns-at-work laws of those states to determine whether the OSH Act
preempts them. In ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, the Northern District of
Oklahoma held the OSH Act preempts Oklahoma’s laws.192 In Florida
this section does not authorize a person to store a firearm on any premises where the possession of
firearms is prohibited by federal law). But see supra note 180; infra note 189.
Georgia’s statute also has an exception for federal law, but it has a different effect than the other
states’ exceptions. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135(d)(6) (West 2008) (providing exception where
transport of firearms on employers’ premises is prohibited by state or federal law). This is because
Georgia’s guns-at-work law does not directly prevent employers from prohibiting employees from
storing guns in vehicles. See id. It prevents vehicle searches and conditioning employment on
agreements not to access firearms stored in vehicles. See id. The statute’s exception is from taking
these actions. See id. § 16-11-135(d). This exception thus permits federal law to trump state
prohibition on the specific conduct outlined in Georgia’s guns-at-work law.
189. One potential problem with this argument is that the wording of some of the exceptions
suggests that they apply when federal law prevents an individual from possessing a firearm
completely, not when federal law permits an individual to possess a firearm generally but prevents
her from possessing the firearm in some contexts, such as in her vehicle at work. See, e.g., KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 237.106(2) (“A person, including but not limited to an employer, who owns, leases,
or otherwise occupies real property may prevent a person who is prohibited by state or federal law
from possessing a firearm or ammunition from possessing a firearm or ammunition on the
property.”); see also supra note 180. One may argue that if the Kentucky legislature intended to
provide exception where federal law only prohibited possession while on work property, it could
have drafted the provision as follows: A person, including but not limited to an employer, who
owns, leases, or otherwise occupies real property may prevent a person who is prohibited by state or
federal law from possessing a firearm or ammunition on the property from possessing a firearm or
ammunition on the property. This revised version is of course quite cumbersome, which may
explain why the legislature did not draft it this way. Further, the language of the statute as currently
drafted is broad enough (federal law prohibiting possession) to encompass federal law prohibiting
possession in certain circumstances (e.g., while at work).
190. This observation of course does not eliminate a conflict with the states that do not have a
federal-law exception in their guns-at-work laws: Kansas, Minnesota, and Oklahoma. See KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 75-7c11 (2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714 (West 2008), held unconstitutional as
applied to church parking lots, Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194, 206–10,
213 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 §§ 1289.7a, 1290.22 (West 2008).
191. See supra notes 188, 190. See also supra note 148; infra app. A.
192. See ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1296, 1330, 1337-40 (N.D.
Okla. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-5166, 2009 WL 388050 (10th
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Retail Federation, Inc. v. Attorney General, the Northern District of
Florida reached the opposite conclusion, finding the OSH Act does not
preempt Florida’s law.193 The Florida court reached the correct
conclusion.194
1. Oklahoma: ConocoPhillips v. Henry
In ConocoPhillips, the Northern District of Oklahoma considered
challenges to Oklahoma’s guns-at-work laws and held the statutes
preempted as in conflict with the OSH Act’s overarching purposes,
codified in 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) and the general duty clause, codified in 29
U.S.C. § 654(a)(1).195 The court explained that Oklahoma’s statutes thwart
the overall purposes of the Act to reduce occupational safety and health
hazards and to stimulate programs for safe and healthy working
conditions.196 According to the court, OSHA has encouraged employers to
enact policies to reduce workplace hazards, but Oklahoma’s guns-at-work
laws prevent that.197 The court also found that the statutes “pose a material
impediment to compliance with the [Act’s] general duty clause” by
prohibiting employers’ chosen method of abatement of a potential
workplace hazard.198 The court thus held that Oklahoma’s guns-at-work
laws conflict with the OSH Act and are preempted.199 It enjoined the
Cir. Feb. 18, 2009).
193. See Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1298 (N.D. Fla. 2008).
194. See infra Part V.
195. ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1296, 1330, 1337–40. The court also considered
whether the statutes constitute an unconstitutional taking of private property rights or an
unconstitutional deprivation of a fundamental right and held they do not. See id. at 1296. For an
analysis of this, see generally Steines, supra note 186, for an argument that parking-lot laws, like
those at issue in ConocoPhillips, do not violate due process, but do constitute unconstitutional
takings and are bad policy.
196. See ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1338.
197. See id. The court found § 1289.7a(B) further thwarts the OSH Act’s purposes by
immunizing employers from civil liability for any occurrences resulting from weapons in vehicles,
and this shields employers from OSH Act liability for gun-related injuries, which undermines the
OSH Act’s purposes. See id. This proves too much. By enacting § 1289.7a(B), the Oklahoma
legislature presumably did not intend that the federal government is restricted by Oklahoma state
law and may not hold someone liable under federal law. Cf. United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S.
720, 733–35 (1982) (explaining that “the Court has never questioned the propriety of absolute
federal immunity from state taxation” and noting that the principle purpose of immunity doctrine is
to prevent clashing sovereigns by preventing states from laying demands directly on federal
government); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 178 (1976) (noting the seminal principle that the
federal Constitution and federal laws control state constitution and laws and cannot be controlled by
them; and explaining that state regulation of the federal government is permitted only where there is
a clear congressional mandate). More likely, § 1289.7a(B) is intending to immunize individuals
from state civil liability for complying with this state law.
198. ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1330, 1337.
199. Id. at 1340.
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statutes to the extent of this preemption.200
The Tenth Circuit recently held that the Northern District of Oklahoma
reached the wrong result in finding preemption.201 In reversing the district
court, the Tenth Circuit first noted the absence of any specific OSHA
standard on workplace violence.202 It explained that gun-related workplace
violence is therefore not a “recognized hazard” for which an employer may
be liable under the general duty clause.203 According to the Tenth Circuit,
“OSHA is aware of the controversy surrounding firearms in the workplace
and has consciously decided not to adopt a standard.”204 Thus, the court
found no conflict preemption between the general duty clause of the OSH
Act and Oklahoma’s guns-at-work laws.205
It also found no conflict between Oklahoma’s guns-at-work laws and
the general purposes of the OSH Act.206 The court explained that the OSH
Act is not a “‘general charter for courts to protect worker safety,’”207 thus
burdening employers to anticipate civic disorder by employees is beyond
the scope of the OSH Act’s general purpose.208 Where, as here, state laws
do not conflict with an OSH Act standard, the court found them not
preempted.209
2. Florida: Florida Retail Federation v. Attorney General
In Florida Retail Federation, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Florida considered whether Florida’s guns-at-work
law violates the OSH Act.210 Reaching a conclusion contrary to the
200. Id. This decision conflicts with a decision of the Northern District of Florida in Florida
Retail Federation v. Attorney General. 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (N.D. Fla. 2008). This Article argues
that the Florida Retail Federation decision is correct while the ConocoPhillips decision is
incorrect. See infra Part V.
201. See Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-5166, 2009 WL 388050, at *1, 5 (10th Cir. Feb.
18, 2009). The Ramsey court cited Florida Retail Federation in its decision. See id.
202. Id. at *3.
203. Id.
204. See id. at *3.
205. See id. at *3–5.
206. Id. at *5.
207. Id. (citing Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1298 (N.D. Fla.
2008)).
208. See id.
209. See id. This conclusion is correct. See infra Part V.
210. See Fla. Retail, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1284. The court also considered whether the statute is
unconstitutional because it compels property owners to make their property available for purposes
that they do not support and because it draws irrational distinction between businesses that are and
are not required to permit guns in parking lots. Id. The court decided the preemption issue on a
motion for preliminary injunction, see id., but it converted this to a final judgment on the merits
pursuant to the parties’ agreement, see Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. (Fla. Retail II), 576 F.
Supp. 2d 1301, 1302 (N.D. Fla. 2008).
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Northern District of Oklahoma, Chief Judge Robert L. Hinkle held that the
Act does not preempt Florida’s law.211 The court rested its decision on two
independent bases.212
First, the court explained that because the Secretary of Labor has not
promulgated any standards, § 18(a) clearly applies to permit the states to
regulate, and it therefore forecloses preemption.213 Second, the court
rejected the argument that the general duty clause requires preemption.214 It
reasoned that to find that the general duty clause preempts state guns-atwork laws requires finding that the general duty clause mandates banning
guns from parking lots for safety and that employers would necessarily
face liability if they did not ban guns.215 But, this is not the case: employers
do not necessarily face liability under the general duty clause for failing to
ban guns from parking lots; thus, the general duty clause does not require
invalidating state guns-at-work laws that prevent employers from banning
guns.216 For these reasons, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the
OSH Act preempts Florida’s guns-at-work law.217
V. THE OSH ACT DOES NOT PREEMPT STATE GUNS-AT-WORK
LAWS
This Part argues that the Northern District of Florida reached the
correct conclusion: the OSH Act does not preempt state guns-at-work laws.
It first examines whether either of the OSH Act savings clauses save these
laws from preemption and argues that § 18(a) should. It next maintains that
even if neither savings clause saves these laws, they are still not preempted
because neither express nor implied preemption exists. Courts therefore
should not displace state guns-at-work laws.
A. Do the OSH Act Savings Clauses Save these Laws?
This Section examines whether either of the OSH Act’s two savings
clauses saves state guns-at-work laws from preemption. It concludes that
while § 4(b)(4) does not, § 18(a) should be read to save guns-at-work laws
from OSH Act preemption.
211. Fla. Retail, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1298–99.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See id. Because the general duty clause likely does not require employers to ban guns
from vehicles, it seems unlikely Florida Statute § 790.251(7)(g), which creates an exception where
firearm possession is prohibited pursuant to federal law, will enable employers to use the OSH Act
to avoid complying with Florida’s guns-at-work law. See supra note 148. If, however, the general
duty clause required banning guns from parking lots, then the OSH Act might excuse compliance.
See supra note 148. Either scenario prevents a conflict with the OSH Act.
217. See Fla. Retail, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1299–1300.
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1. Section 4(b)(4) Likely Does Not Save These Laws
The plain language of § 4(b)(4) suggests that it will not save guns-atwork laws.218 The first half of § 4(b)(4) (everything before the “or”)219 is
referred to here as the “workmen’s compensation clause,” and the
remainder is simply known as “remainder clause.”220
The workmen’s compensation clause is limited to only workmen’s
compensation laws and is therefore easily eliminated as a vehicle to save
state guns-at-work laws, which are not workmen’s compensation laws.221
The remainder clause is also inapplicable because it applies only to laws
“with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees.”222 Guns-at-work
laws govern the storage of guns in vehicles,223 and not injuries, diseases, or
death of employees.224
2. Section 18(a) Should Save These Laws
Unlike § 4(b)(4), § 18(a) should save these laws. Section 18(a)
expressly permits states to assert jurisdiction under state law over any
occupational safety or health issue where no federal standard is in effect.225
This section unequivocally expresses Congress’ intent not to preempt state
law absent a standard.226 Without a federal standard, states may govern.227
218. See supra Part III.C.1.
219. See supra Part III.C.1.
220. See 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (2006).
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See supra Part IV.
224. Of course, one might counter that guns-at-work laws permit employees to have guns, and
this fact may lead to injury or death of employees, and therefore such laws fall within the remainder
clause. This stretches the language of the remainder clause too far, and no court appears to have
accepted such an argument. Moreover, although § 4(b)(4) is broadly worded, it has been construed
primarily to save only state tort laws and criminal laws. See supra Part III.C.1. Only some of the
state guns-at-work laws are part of the states’ penal codes. See infra app. A. Those laws would still
have trouble under § 4(b)(4) because they are not necessarily laws “with respect to injuries,
diseases, or death.” 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4). The same is true for guns-at-work laws that may be
classified as tort laws.
In addition to tort and criminal laws, § 4(b)(4) has also been applied to save rights granted by
statute. See Startz v. Tom Martin Constr. Co., 823 F. Supp. 501, 506 (N.D. Ill. 1993). But, this
statutory right directly involved injury or death and so is distinguishable from guns-at-work laws.
See id. at 502–03, 506 (finding plaintiff’s personal injury claim under Illinois statute was saved and
therefore not preempted); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety Health Review
Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 444–45 (1977) (explaining that “existing state statutory and common-law
remedies for actual injury and death remain unaffected” by the OSH Act). As mentioned, guns-atwork laws are not laws “with respect to injuries, diseases, or death.” See 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4).
225. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(a).
226. See id. (“Nothing in this Act shall prevent any State agency or court from asserting
jurisdiction under State law over any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which no
standard is in effect under section [655 of this title].”).
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Here, there is no federal standard governing the prevention of workplace
violence relevant to guns-at-work laws.228 OSHA generally defers to state
and local law enforcement to regulate workplace violence.229 Thus, the
OSH Act plainly permits states to regulate.230 As the Northern District of
Florida stated, § 18(a) could not be clearer and prevents preemption of
guns-at-work laws. 231 To find otherwise ignores clear congressional intent.
a. The Express Intent of Congress Prevents Preemption
The rule applicable to express preemption is instructive here.232 When
Congress has made its intent known through explicit statutory language,
the court’s task is simply to give effect to that language.233 “Although this
227. See id.
228. See Letter from Richard E. Fairfax to Morgan Melekos, supra note 127 (recognizing in a
Standard Interpretation letter that no standards exist); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
& HEALTH ADMIN., Workplace Violence, OSHA Standards, http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/workplace
violence/standards.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) (stating that as of February 28, 2009, no
standards exist for workplace violence); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH
ADMIN., Safety & Health Topics, Workplace Violence, http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/workplaceviol
ence/index.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2009) (stating OSHA is not initiating rulemaking on
workplace violence at this time); see also ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282,
1339 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (noting there are no specific “standards” governing workplace violence),
rev’d sub nom. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-5166, 2009 WL 388050 (10th Cir. Feb. 18,
2009).
Moreover, the general duty clause is not a “standard.” See, e.g., Wilcox v. Niagara of Wis.
Paper Corp., 965 F.2d 355, 366 n.* (7th Cir. 1992) (Cummings, J., concurring) (maintaining that
the Seventh Circuit has never held the general duty clause is a “standard” that preempts state law
and contending such a finding “would be extremely ill-advised” as it “would imperil numerous
traditional areas of state general health and safety regulation and would seem to subvert 29 U.S.C.
§ 667(a)”); Puffer’s Hardware, Inc. v. Donovan, 742 F.2d 12, 15–17 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding no
“standard” governed where employer was cited for violation of general duty clause); Traudt v.
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 692 A.2d 1326, 1332 (D.C. 1997) (stating general duty clause is not a
“standard” promulgated by rule under § 655, and the OSH Act preemption subsections only apply
to federal standards promulgated by rule under that section); see also P & Z Co., Inc. v. District of
Columbia, 408 A.2d 1249, 1250 (D.C. 1979) (explaining “standard” is a term of art, and the OSH
Act preemption sections apply only to standards promulgated under § 655).
It is important to distinguish between federal standards that fall within § 18 and other federal
regulations that may be relevant to issues of workplace violence. The former are limited to
standards in effect per § 655 of Title 29 of the United States Code. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(a)–(b). A
federal regulation not promulgated under § 655 may relate to guns on workplace property, see, e.g.,
39 C.F.R. § 232.1(l) (2009) (“[N]o person while on postal property may carry firearms . . . or store
the same on postal property, except for official purposes.”), but it does not fall within § 18(a), see
29 U.S.C. § 667(a)–(b).
229. See Letter from Richard E. Fairfax to Morgan Melekos, supra note 127.
230. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(a).
231. See Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1298 (N.D. Fla. 2008).
232. See State ex rel. Stenehjem v. FreeEats.com, Inc., 712 N.W.2d 828, 841 (N.D. 2006)
(citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990)).
233. Id.
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rule is ordinarily applied in situations where Congress has expressly
declared that certain state laws are preempted, [there is] no reason why it
does not apply with equal force when Congress clearly and unambiguously
states that certain state laws are not preempted by the federal act.”234 In
both, “the intent of Congress is clear from the statutory language, and the
court's ‘easy’ and solitary task is to enforce the statute according to its
terms.”235
The same rationale applies here. Congress has included a clause
expressly stating that nothing in the OSH Act prevents states from
regulating where no federal standard is in place.236 Indeed, no federal
standard is in place.237 The express language of the Act prevents courts
from finding guns-at-work laws preempted in conflict with the general
duty clause or any other part of the OSH Act.238
If the federal government wants exclusivity over the guns-in-vehiclesat-work issue, it must first promulgate standards. In the absence of
standards, the express text of the Act provides that states control.239
Despite these arguments, the Northern District of Oklahoma (despite
acknowledging § 18(a)) held that the OSH Act impliedly preempts
Oklahoma’s guns-at-work laws.240 The court found Oklahoma’s guns-at234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(a).
237. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
238. There is admittedly an issue with this argument. Geier seems to suggest that a court
should only refrain from performing implied conflict preemption if the savings clause states
something like “implied conflict preemption analysis is not permitted.” See Geier v. Am. Honda
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000). The Court seems to be suggesting that Congress can save
state law from express preemption through a savings clause, but it may not save state law from
implied preemption unless the savings clause declares this expressly. See id. at 867–74; see also
Jeffers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 617, 620 (S.D. W. Va. 2001) (explaining that a
savings clause merely limits the scope of express preemption but does not prevent conflict
preemption and citing Geier).
One might therefore argue that because § 18(a) contains no such language, state guns-at-work
laws may be preempted as in conflict with the OSH Act. As discussed further in Part V.A.2.b,
applying such a broad reading of Geier should be rejected here in light of the clear language of
§ 18(a) that can only mean states may govern in the absence of federal standards. Further, applying
Geier that broadly is undesirable since doing so undermines the clear efforts of Congress, which
may not realize its seemingly clear directive in § 18(a) needs altering to prevent all preemption. See
Stone ex rel. Estate of Stone v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 28, 32 (D. Mass. 2002)
(“The sweep of the Supreme Court’s implied preemption doctrine is of particular concern to
Congress because Congress’ focus is necessarily on the issue sought to be remedied by a pending
bill, not on the unintended consequences for existing state and federal legislation. Indeed, even
express Congressional disclaimers of preemptive effect have proven ineffective in light of this
jurisprudence.”).
239. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(a).
240. See ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1325–30 (N.D. Okla. 2007),
rev’d sub nom. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-5166, 2009 WL 388050 (10th Cir. Feb. 18,
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work laws create an obstacle to the fulfillment of the OSH Act’s general
purposes and its general duty clause.241 The court explained that
Oklahoma’s laws prevent an employer from using one of its chosen
methods to create a safe work environment, and thus conflict with the OSH
Act and are therefore preempted by it.242
Though the Oklahoma court addressed § 18(a), its treatment leaves
much to be desired. The court discussed the negative implications of
§ 18(a), but it failed to grapple with the positive implications of § 18(a),
i.e. the effect of its express language.243 Instead, the court erroneously
reasoned that because the alleged conflict between the state law and the
OSH Act does not concern OSH Act “standards,” § 18(a) does not even
apply.244 The court missed the point that § 18(a) clearly permits states to
regulate in the absence of standards, and so they should be free to regulate
here.245
Preempting state law where § 18(a) expressly saves state law because
other portions of the OSH Act (such as the general duty clause or the
general purposes provision) impliedly conflict with that state law makes
little sense. In doing so, the express text of the statute—§ 18(a)—is
completely ignored in favor of implied preemption.
Though this reading ignores the plain meaning of § 18(a), it is not
wholly irrational in light of a non-OSH Act case, Geier v. American Honda
Motor Co., in which the Supreme Court held that though a savings clause
may save state law from express preemption, it may not save it from
implied preemption.246 As shown in the next Section, however, Geier
should not override § 18(a).
b. Geier Should Not Bar the Plain Meaning of § 18(a)
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether § 18(a) prevents
preemption here.247 But the Supreme Court’s opinion in Geier v. American
2009). The court relied in part on Geier’s progeny in which the Supreme Court noted that an
express preemption clause does not bar the ordinary workings of implied conflict preemption. See
id. at 1327 (citing Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65 (2002) (citing Geier v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000)).
241. ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1337–38.
242. Id.
243. See id. at 1325–27.
244. See id. at 1326–27.
245. See id. at 1325–30.
246. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) (citing Freightliner Corp.
v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995)).
247. In Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Association, the Court considered
whether the OSH Act preempted state law and held it impliedly did. Gade, 505 U.S. at 108–09.
Gade is distinguishable because there were federal standards on point, thus § 18(a) did not apply.
See 29 U.S.C. 667(a) (2006); Gade, 505 U.S. at 92–93, 98–100. Here there are no such standards.
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Honda Motor Co., a case involving a different federal law, suggests that
the Court may not agree that § 18(a) unequivocally saves state guns-atwork laws.248 In Geier, the Court held that a “saving clause (like [an]
See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
248. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 869–74 (explaining that preemption provision in federal statute
does not, by itself, foreclose through negative implication conflict preemption, and holding savings
clause does not either). According to Geier, a savings clause may support a narrow reading of an
express preemption clause, but this does not affect implied preemption. See id. at 868–74. As the
Court explained, neither the savings clause, express preemption clause, nor both together create a
special burden against implied preemption. Id. at 870–74. A broad savings clause does mean,
however, a court should not “hunt for a conflict” between state and federal law. See In re Welding
Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 364 F. Supp. 2d 669, 688–89 (N.D. Ohio 2005). A conflict must be
“‘direct, clear and substantial.’” Id. at 689 (quoting Gade, 505 U.S. at 107).
Prior to Geier, the Court reached a similar conclusion regarding federal law that contained an
express preemption provision that did not preempt the state law at issue. See Freightliner, 514 U.S.
at 287–89 (rejecting argument that Court need not consider implied preemption because federal law
contains express preemption clause that does not apply). In Freightliner, respondent and the Court
of Appeals maintained that because the federal law contained an express preemption provision, the
scope of preemption was limited to the scope of the express preemption clause, and implied conflict
preemption could not exist because the federal law contained an express preemption provision. Id.
at 287. The Court rejected this claim and explained that implied preemption is still possible despite
an express preemption clause that does not apply. See id. at 287–89. But see Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516–17 (1992) (finding preemptive scope entirely governed by express
preemption clause and implied preemption inapplicable). For a thorough discussion of the Court’s
retreat from the position taken in Cipollone, see Ausness, supra note 43, at 940–71, which traces
the Court’s post-Cipollone jurisprudence in which it has generally applied implied preemption
despite an express preemption clause and arguing that the Court should return to its Cipollone
position and decline to preempt state law on implied grounds where express preemption clause
exists. The Court’s current position has been criticized as opening the door to preempting numerous
cases not before considered appropriately preempted. See Martin A. Kotler, The Myth of
Individualism and the Appeal of Tort Reform, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 779, 828–29 (2007).
Despite such criticisms, the Court has continued to adhere to this position. See Sprietsma v.
Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65 (2002) (“Congress’ inclusion of an express pre-emption clause
‘does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles’ . . . .” (citing Geier, 529 U.S.
at 869)); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352 (2001) (rejecting argument
that Court should be reluctant to find conflict preemption because of express preemption provision
and reiterating that neither express preemption provision nor savings clause prevent implied
preemption); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 387–88 (2000) (“[T]he
existence of conflict cognizable under the Supremacy Clause does not depend on express
congressional recognition that federal and state law may conflict.”).
Lower courts have recognized that this is the Supreme Court’s position where express
preemption provisions and savings clauses are concerned. See, e.g., James v. Mazda Motor Corp.,
222 F.3d 1323, 1326 (11th Cir. 2000) (explaining Geier made clear courts should apply normal,
implied preemption principles despite savings clause); In re Welding, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 678–79
(N.D. Ohio 2005) (“Thus, even when Congress states expressly what aspects of state law it means
to pre-empt, courts must still infer pre-emption beyond the confines of Congress's statements if state
law actually conflicts with federal law.”); Gonzalez v. Ideal Tile Importing Co, 877 A.2d 1247,
1250–53 (N.J. 2005) (per curiam) (acknowledging savings clause but finding OSHA preempts state
tort action because of conflict). But see Lindsey v. Caterpillar, Inc., 480 F.3d 202, 209–10 (3d Cir.
2007) (distinguishing Geier and finding it does not compel conclusion that savings clause cannot
foreclose further preemption analysis).
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express pre-emption provision) does not bar the ordinary working of
conflict pre-emption principles.”249 The Supreme Court has found that
§ 18(a) is a savings clause.250 Therefore, even the plain text of § 18(a) may
not prevent conflict preemption.251 But Geier should not be extended to
apply here.252 It did not involve the OSH Act.253 It concerned a different
law, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966
(NTMVSA),254 which does not contain the same clear, congressional
directive embodied in § 18(a).255
The NTMVSA savings clause states that compliance with a federal
safety standard does not exempt any person from liability under common
law.256 The Court held that the savings clause did not prevent conflict
preemption of tort claims that conflict with the NTMVSA federal safety
standards.257 The Court explained that nothing in the text of that savings
clause evinced Congress intent to save state tort actions that conflict with

249. Geier, 529 U.S. at 869.
250. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 100.
251. That this argument is even tenable reveals a major problem with the Court’s current
conflict preemption jurisprudence: attempting to uncover Congress’ intent, the Court permits
displacing Congress’s express statements of intent for the implied intent the Court discovers.
252. See, e.g., Ariz. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1049–50 (D.
Ariz. 2008) (rejecting argument that Geier helps establish universal rule that savings clauses must
be minimized no matter the effect on or magnitude of the state police powers at issue); Levine v.
Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 193–94 (Vt. 2006) (explaining that Geier “simply stands for the proposition
that Congress’ intent not to preempt a provision of state law cannot be inferred from either (1) an
express preemption clause that does not include the state law in question in its scope, or (2) a clause
that prevents regulated entities from using compliance with federal law as a defense in state
common-law suits,” but it does not permit preemption of state laws that have been expressly saved
by Congress), aff’d, No. 06-1249, 2009 WL 529172 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2009).
At least one court has agreed that Geier does not apply to one of the OSH Act savings clauses,
§ 4(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4). See Lindsey, 480 F.3d at 210 (distinguishing Geier and finding
“[it] does not compel a conclusion that the savings clause in this case cannot foreclose further
preemption analysis”).
253. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 864.
254. Id. The NTMVSA contains two relevant provisions: a preemption provision and a savings
clause. See id. at 867–68. The preemption provision provides that whenever a federal motor vehicle
safety standard is in effect, no state may establish or continue a state standard that is not identical.
Id. at 867 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988)). The Court held that the preemption provision did
not preempt the tort claims at issue. Id. at 868.
255. Courts routinely struggle with the question of the preemptive effect of Congressional
statutes. See, e.g., E. Farish Percy, Applying the Common Fund Doctrine to an ERISA-Governed
Benefit Plan’s Claim for Subrogation or Reimbursement, 61 FLA. L. REV. 55, 60 (2009) (noting
varying decisions on whether ERISA preempts state-law actions for reimbursement or subrogation,
or state common fund doctrines); Carole J. Buckner, Due Process in Class Arbitration, 58 FLA. L.
REV. 185, 194 n.41 (2006) (discussing preemption by the Federal Arbitration Act).
256. Geier, 529 U.S. at 868 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988)).
257. See id. at 867–70.
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federal regulations.258 Rather, the court found that the savings clause
merely bars a certain kind of defense in those actions: that compliance with
a federal standard automatically exempts defendants from state law
whether Congress intended the federal standard to be an absolute
requirement or only a minimal one.259
The OSH Act savings clause is very different. It clearly states that
nothing in the Act prevents states from regulating where no federal
standard is in place.260 Unlike the NTMVSA savings clause, which does
not unequivocally eliminate conflict preemption, § 18(a) plainly does. The
plain language of § 18(a) necessarily means there can be no conflict where
no federal standard is in place. Where no federal standard is in place,
Congress has clearly ceded regulatory power to the states.
Applying Geier despite § 18(a)’s clear directive suggests that the only
way Congress may effectively “save” state law from all preemption—
including implied conflict preemption—is to include an explicit directive
that implied preemption shall not apply. But this conclusion makes little
sense. Through § 18(a), Congress has expressed its position on the balance
of state-federal sovereignty:261 in the absence of a standard, state law
controls worker health and safety.
Courts should not search for an “implied” conflict with the express text
of the OSH Act.262 If any conflict exists, it is with § 18(a), not state law.
Where an act’s savings clause expressly permits state action, there can be
no conflict, Geier notwithstanding.263

258. See id. at 869.
259. See id.
260. 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (2006).
261. See id.
262. See State ex rel. Stenehjem v. FreeEats.com, Inc., 712 N.W.2d 828, 840–41 (N.D. 2006).
263. See id. (distinguishing Geier and its progeny because they do not involve express
provisions explicitly providing that nothing in the federal statute shall preempt state law, and
holding that where Congress has included an express provision granting states power to enact laws,
it cannot frustrate the purposes of Congress when states act pursuant to that grant); cf. Jeffers v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 617, 623 (S.D. W. Va. 2001) (analyzing Geier and
explaining that though the limited express preemption provision at issue does not foreclose conflict
preemption, it cannot be ignored, and finding conflict preemption does not apply because the goals
and purposes of the federal act in combination with the express preemption provision suggest
Congress did not intend to preempt more). In reaching this conclusion, the Jeffers court highlights
that the federal law contemplates a partnership in which the states retain their traditional powers,
and it points to a statutory provision expressly permiting states to regulate. See id. at 624–25. OSH
Act § 18(a) similarly provides a partnership permitting states to regulate. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(a).
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B. No Express Preemption
No OSH Act provision expressly preempts guns-at-work laws.264
Indeed, as discussed in Part IV, the majority of guns-at-work laws
automatically yield to federal law according to their express terms. Express
preemption is entirely absent. So too is implied preemption.
C. No Implied Preemption
Courts are generally reluctant to infer preemption,265 and this reluctance
may be even stronger with the OSH Act.266 The Act’s language and history
suggest that “[it] should be interpreted in a manner that prevents the
interference with states’ exercise of police powers to protect their
citizens.”267 Guns-at-work laws are exercises of police power that should
not be disturbed absent a clear conflict with federal law. No such conflict
exists.
1. No Field Preemption
Section 18 confirms that Congress did not intend the federal
government exclusively regulate the entire field of worker-safety
regulation.268 It expressly permits states to regulate where no federal
standard exists.269 Because the OSH Act permits states to regulate in the
264. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–700.
265. See Exxon Corp. v. Gov. of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978); see also Eileen Silverstein,
Against Preemption in Labor Law, 24 CONN. L. REV. 1, 40 (1991) (analyzing OSH Act and
maintaining “the growing body of case law shows little tolerance for elaborate arguments in favor
of broad federal preemption”).
266. See Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48, 53 n.6 (1st Cir. 1991) (“We would be very
reluctant to infer preemptive intent absent some indication that the state law could have a
significant adverse regulatory impact on OSHA’s mission in the workplace.”); see also Wilcox v.
Niagara of Wis. Paper Corp., 965 F.2d 355, 366 n.* (7th Cir. 1992) (Cummings, J., concurring)
(explaining that the Seventh Circuit has not held that the general duty clause is a standard that
preempts state law, and such a decision “would be extremely ill-advised” as it “would imperil
numerous traditional areas of state general health and safety regulation and would seem to subvert
29 U.S.C. § 667(a)”).
267. Lindsey v. Caterpillar, Inc., 480 F.3d 202, 208 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Fernandez, supra
note 111, at 114).
268. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(a)–(b); Puffer’s Hardware, Inc. v. Donovan, 742 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir.
1984). At least one court has interpreted § 18 to mean that “preemption under OSHA arises only
where a state law or regulation concerns an occupational safety and health matter governed by a
specific federal standard and only where an approved state plan is not in effect.” Lepore v. Nat’l
Tool & Mfg. Co., 540 A.2d 1296, 1306 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), aff’d 557 A.2d 1371 (N.J.
1989) (emphasis added).
269. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (permitting states to regulate in the absence of federal standards);
see also Schweiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 922 F.2d 473, 474 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting OSH Act
expressly permits state regulation in occupational safety field of law).
Where a federal standard is in place for a specific issue, that standard preempts the field for that
issue unless the state has a pre-approved plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(b); Indus. Truck Ass’n v.
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field of worker health and safety, field preemption is absent.270 Field
preemption occurs only where the field is reserved for federal regulation,
and Congress has left no room for state regulation.271 This is clearly not the
case with the OSH Act,272 which embodies a system of cooperative
federalism.273
2. No Conflict Preemption
Even absent field preemption, the OSH Act may impliedly preempt
state guns-at-work laws if they conflict with the OSH Act.274 But no
conflict exists.275
a. No Impossibility Conflict Preemption
Impossibility conflict preemption occurs where the federal and state
statutes are in “irreconcilable conflict,” imposing directly conflicting duties
with impossibility of dual compliance—“as they would, for example, if the
federal law said, ‘you must sell insurance,’ while the state law said, ‘you

Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1310–11 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[W]hen OSHA promulgates a federal standard,
that standard totally occupies the field within the ‘issue’ of that regulation and preempts all state
occupational safety and health laws relating to that issue, conflicting or not, unless they are
included in the state plan.”); see also Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 104,
n.2 (1992) (plurality opinion) (“Although we have chosen to use the term ‘conflict’ pre-emption,
we could as easily have stated that the promulgation of a federal safety and health standard ‘preempts the field’ for any nonapproved state law regulating the same safety and health issue.”).
270. See Puffer’s, 742 F.2d at 16; see also ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d
1282, 1302 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (finding field preemption absent), rev’d sub nom. Ramsey Winch,
Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-5166, 2009 WL 388050 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 2009); Gonzalez v. Ideal Tile
Importing Co., 877 A.2d 1247, 1251 (N.J. 2005) (same). Congress has also made clear it does not
intend to preempt the field where firearms are concerned. See 18 U.S.C. § 927.
271. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 69 (2002). “[F]ederal regulation of a field
of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of
persuasive reasons—either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other
conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained.” Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
272. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 96 (“Federal regulation of the workplace was not intended to be all
encompassing, however.”); Schweiss, 922 F.2d at 474 (noting that OSH Act expressly permits state
regulation in the occupational safety field of law); Puffer’s, 742 F.2d at 16 (“The express language
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act clearly indicates that in the absence of an applicable
standard Congress did not intend that OSHA occupy an entire field of regulation, thereby ousting
any state regulation.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Berardi v. Getty
Ref. & Mktg., Co., 435 N.Y.S.2d 212, 217 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980); Silverstein, supra note 267, at 39.
273. See supra Part III.B.
274. See supra Part II.B.2. See also ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282,
1330–40 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (finding Oklahoma’s guns-at-work laws impliedly preempted as in
conflict with the OSH Act), rev’d sub nom. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-5166, 2009 WL
388050 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 2009).
275. Because there are no federal standards in place, Gade does not require finding
preemption. See supra note 247; see also supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text;
ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1326–27 (finding Gade conflict preemption lacking).
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may not.’”276 The OSH Act does not expressly require something that
guns-at-work laws prohibit or vice versa, nor is it physically impossible to
comply with both.277 The OSH Act merely mandates that employers
provide a work environment free from recognized hazards,278 while gunsat-work laws require that employers may not prohibit individuals from
storing guns in vehicles.279 The OSH Act does not expressly prevent
locking guns in vehicles, nor has OSHA clarified that storing guns in
vehicles is a recognized hazard that necessarily threatens employee health
and safety.280 Employers can still provide a safe environment while
permitting employees to store their guns in their vehicles.281 Impossibility
conflict preemption does not exist.282
b. No Obstacle Conflict Preemption
State guns-at-work laws are therefore only preempted if they frustrate
the purposes of the federal law283 and are so inconsistent that they must
yield.284 The test is whether the state law creates an obstacle to
accomplishing Congress’s full purposes and objectives.285 The state law
must be a “material impediment to the federal action, or ‘thwart[] the
federal policy in a material way.’”286 No rigid formula exists: evaluation is
276. See Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996); see also Fla. Lime & Avocado
Growers, 373 U.S. at 143.
277. See ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1329.
278. See 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2006).
279. See supra Part IV.
280. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. Indeed, OSHA has suggested the contrary.
See infra notes 324–31 and accompanying text.
281. See infra Part V.C.2.b.i.
282. See ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1329 (finding Oklahoma’s guns-at-work laws do
not create impossibility conflict preemption with the OSH Act); cf. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl
Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 457 F. Supp. 2d 324, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding no impossibility
conflict preemption because it was not physically impossible to comply with both state and federal
law).
283. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 78–79 (1987) (explaining that
absent express preemption, preemption occurs only where compliance with both laws is a physical
impossibility or where compliance with state law frustrates the purposes of the federal law, and
finding because it is possible to comply with both, preemption only exists if state law frustrates
federal purposes).
284. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977).
285. Id.; see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Mgmt. Ass’n for Private
Photogrammetric Surveyors v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 2d 596, 603–04 (E.D. Va. 2006) (“In
other words, in obstacle preemption cases federal law does not completely occupy a field of law,
nor does state law require an act that federal law forbids (or vice-versa), but state law instead
impedes some policy or purpose of a federal statute or regulation.” (footnotes omitted)).
286. See Mount Olivet Cemetery Ass’n v. Salt Lake City, 164 F.3d 480, 489 (10th Cir. 1998)
(citation omitted) (quoting Blue Circle Cement v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 27 F.3d 1499, 1509
(10th Cir. 1994)).
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case-by-case287 and considers the relationship between the state and federal
laws as written, interpreted, and applied.288
There is no basis to conclude that guns-at-work laws create an obstacle
to and conflict with the OSH Act. The Northern District of Oklahoma
found a conflict with the Act’s purposes and general duty clause, but the
court based this on the assumption that guns-at-work laws decrease
employee safety.289 As shown by the data, this assumption is not
necessarily true.290
i. Guns-at-Work Laws Do Not Conflict with the General
Purpose of the OSH Act
The general purpose of the OSH Act is to enhance worker safety.291
Guns-at-work laws do not threaten this objective. This is because
“workplace homicides are not the result of disgruntled workers who take
out their frustrations on coworkers or supervisors . . . rather, they are
mostly robbery-related crimes.”292
According to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health,
the federal agency responsible for recommending ways to prevent workrelated injuries,293 the “vast majority of workplace homicides” involve

287. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
288. Jones, 420 U.S. at 526 (finding state law stands as an obstacle to accomplishing the full
objectives of Congress in enacting federal act where congressional goal is to facilitate value
comparisons among similar products, and state law would effectively prevent any meaningful
comparison).
289. See ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp.2d 1282, 1334–40 (N.D. Okla. 2007),
rev’d sub nom. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-5166, 2009 WL 388050 (10th Cir. Feb. 18,
2009). It was also based on the court’s assumption that because guns-at-work laws prevent
employers’ “chosen” method of enhancing safety (preventing guns in vehicles), they necessarily
impede the objectives and duties of the OSH Act to enhance safety. See id. at 1336–39. Employers
can still comply with the general duty clause and general purposes though their “chosen” method
may be eliminated by state law. That an employer’s choices are restricted is no basis to displace
state law.
290. See infra Part V.C.2.b.i.
291. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2006).
292. See NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., Violence in the Workplace, Homicide in the Workplace, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/violh
omi.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2009). Data on homicides is used because it is the most readily
accessible. Indeed, when OSHA has considered the issue of guns at work and workplace violence, it
too has focused on workplace homicides. See Letter from Richard E. Fairfax to Morgan Melekos,
supra note 127. Further, though there are undoubtedly cases of workplace violence that did not
result in death, when eliminating all cases not involving guns and focusing only on gun cases (the
only cases relevant to this Article), it is doubtful that the rationale applying to homicides does not
apply to these cases simply because the gun that was used did not result in death.
293. NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
FACT SHEET 1, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/pdfs/2003-116.pdf.
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perpetrators with no legitimate relationship to the business.294 Employer
policies prohibiting employees from locking weapons in cars do not even
apply to these individuals.
Unlike random criminals, employees are more likely to follow
employer anti-weapon policies, but worker-on-worker fatalities (where the
perpetrator is a present or past employee) account for a small percentage of
workplace homicides—only 7%.295 Employer policies prohibiting or
permitting guns in vehicles would not affect the portion of these homicides
committed by past employees because past employees are no longer bound
by such policies. Current employees are of course bound, but they also can
be required to attend employer-sponsored training, which is critical to
prevent worker-on-worker violence.296
Moreover, individuals with extensive criminal records generally
commit more murders than ordinary people with access to weapons.297
Individuals undeterred by moral obligation or criminal laws are hardly
likely to heed employer policies preventing them from storing guns in
vehicles. Because those most likely to threaten worker safety with guns are
least likely to follow policies prohibiting guns in vehicles, eliminating the
policies will not necessarily decrease safety.
Further, there is evidence to suggest that gun ownership actually
correlates with increased safety.298 One commentator maintains that public
gun access is a deterrent to crime.299 Criminals who know potential victims
have access to weapons are less likely to commit crimes that bring them in

294. NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
WORKPLACE VIOLENCE PREVENTION STRATEGIES AND RESEARCH NEEDS 4, http://www.cdc.gov/nio
sh/docs/2006-144/pdfs/2006-144.pdf. The crimes involved may include robbery, shoplifting,
trespass, and terrorism. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 17–18.
297. Don B. Kates & Gary Mauser, Would Banning Firearms Reduce Murder and Suicide?: A
Review of International and Some Domestic Evidence, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 649, 665–70
(2007).
298. See id. at 653, 673 (“[T]he available international data cannot be squared with the mantra
that more guns equal more death and fewer guns equal less death. Rather, if firearms availability
does matter, the data consistently show that the way it matters is that more guns equal less violent
crime.”). According to Kates and Mauser, “adoption of state laws permitting millions of qualified
citizens to carry guns has not resulted in more murder or violent crime in these states. Rather,
adoption of these statutes has been followed by very significant reductions in murder and violence
in these states.” Id. at 659 (emphasis added); see also John R. Lott, Jr., Does Allowing Law-Abiding
Citizens to Carry Concealed Handguns Save Lives?, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 355, 358–61 (1997)
(conducting research and finding that permitting citizens to carry concealed weapons creates
deterrent effect for criminals, reducing murders by 8%, rapes by 5%, aggravated assaults by 7%,
and robbery by 3%).
299. See Lott, Jr., supra note 298, at 359–60.
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contact with potentially armed victims.300 Even individuals without guns
benefit from this deterrence effect.301
Of course, this is correlation not causation, but it undermines the
argument that accessibility to guns necessarily decreases safety. Guns-atwork laws arguably protect workers by enabling them to keep their
firearms nearby for self-defense and by deterring criminals who recognize
that workers may have easily accessible means of protection.
The other side to this debate highlights many instances where guns
have escalated dangerous situations into deadly tragedies.302 This valid
position must not be ignored. This Article does not maintain that guns-atwork laws are a good idea or even that they necessarily increase safety by
arming the “proper” parties. It merely shows that the OSH Act’s general
purpose of worker safety cannot be used to defeat guns-at-work laws
because such laws do not necessarily obstruct that purpose and indeed may
actually further it. At best, the evidence is indeterminate and points in
either direction. A court therefore should not find that guns-at-work laws
conflict with the general purposes of the OSH Act.
Finding a conflict between guns-at-work laws and the OSH Act’s
general purposes is based on speculation, and such reasoning is
impermissible. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, a hypothetical or
speculative conflict is insufficient for preemption: conflict should not be
created where none actually exists.303
To determine whether an actual conflict exists, courts look for “‘special
features warranting pre-emption.’”304 These include the dominance of the
federal interest in the area, such as in foreign affairs, which militates in
favor of preemption.305 Areas such as health and safety, which states have
300. Id. at 360.
301. Id.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 8–11.
303. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990) (rejecting argument that actions will
occur that will create conflict as too speculative for preemption); Hillsborough County v.
Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 720 (1985) (finding argument that county ordinance is
an obstacle to federal goal is “too speculative to support pre-emption”); Exxon Corp. v. Governor
of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 130–31 (1978) (finding the existence of potential conflicts too speculative to
warrant preemption); see also Schweiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 922 F.2d 473, 475–76 (8th Cir.
1990) (rejecting argument that state law frustrates congressional purpose and is preempted because
lack of evidence renders argument speculative). Even if there is an actual conflict, state law is
displaced only to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law. See Dalton v. Little Rock Family
Planning Servs., 516 U.S. 474, 476 (1996).
304. English, 496 U.S. at 87 (quoting Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 719).
305. See Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 719. For instance, where a federal law governing
foreign relations invests the President with a plentitude of authority, and state law would impose
different pressure, the state law creates a conflict compromising the President’s ability to speak with
one voice in foreign affairs. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 375–77,
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traditionally regulated, disfavor preemption.306
Because guns-at-work laws regulate health and safety, courts must
pause before displacing these state laws. During this pause, courts should
notice that neither the OSH Act, nor OSHA, nor the Secretary of Labor has
decreed that storing guns in vehicles threatens worker safety—quite the
contrary307—and there is evidence suggesting that guns may actually
increase safety.
ii. Guns-at-Work Laws Do Not Conflict with the Act’s General
Duty Clause
The general duty clause requires employers to furnish employees a
place of employment free from recognized hazards.308 These hazards
traditionally arise from some condition inherent in the workplace
environment.309 Though there may be circumstances where failing to
protect employees from violence could be a general-duty-clause violation,
the OSH Act is not typically enforced this way.310
It is unlikely that employers would face general-duty-clause liability for
random acts of violence that courts do not recognize as part of the nature
of the specific business but rather as “random antisocial acts which may
occur anywhere.”311 Surely, the general duty clause would not hold an
employer liable when an employee inexplicably shoots a coworker for no
apparent reason or where a minor argument that should normally lead to
nothing more than hurt feelings turns deadly.
Employers cannot prevent intentional, violent acts of employees.312 If
380–82, 388 (2000). Similarly, where Congress clearly intended to limit economic pressure on a
foreign country, yet state law penalizes conduct Congress explicitly exempted, there is a conflict.
See id. at 377–80. Crosby highlighted additional evidence supporting its conclusion that a conflict
existed, including that in response to the passage of the state act, a number of United States allies
filed formal protests; the European Union and Japan filed formal complaints against the U.S. with
the World Trade Organization; and, the Executive consistently represented that the state act has
complicated its dealing with foreign sovereigns. Id. at 382–84. Though the Court does not blindly
defer to such opinions, it is competent and direct evidence of the state act’s frustration of
congressional objectives. Id. at 385–86.
306. See Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 719.
307. See supra note 228 and accompanying text, and infra notes 324–31 and accompanying
text.
308. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2006).
309. See Megawest Fin., Inc., Dec. & Orders Occ. Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n No. 932879, 1995 OSAHRC LEXIS 80, at *24 (May 8, 1995).
310. Efforts to Prevent Workplace Violence Slow in Coming from Federal OSHA Program, 23
O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 334 (Aug. 25, 1993).
311. Id.
312. An employer may, however, be held responsible for a negligent employee’s conduct if
such conduct could have been prevented through feasible precautions such as proper training. See
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an employee wants to commit a crime, he will likely find a way to do it. “A
demented, suicidal, or willfully reckless employee may on occasion
circumvent the best conceived and most vigorously enforced safety
regime,” but this is not within the purview of the employer’s general duty
requirement.313 Employers are not necessarily responsible for the aberrant
behavior of employees.314
The OSH Act is concerned with increasing workplace safety, but
random acts of violence are not workplace specific. They occur anywhere
and everywhere, affecting society as a whole. Thus, society and its safety
arm, the police, bear the burden of eliminating general violence, not
employers.
Nonetheless, OSHA advised in a letter of interpretation that the general
duty clause may require an employer to take action to abate a risk of
workplace violence.315 The Northern District of Oklahoma seized on this
letter to support its conclusion that guns-at-work laws necessarily conflict
with the general duty clause.316 In that letter, OSHA stated:
In a workplace where the risk of violence and serious
personal injury are significant enough to be “recognized
hazards,” the general duty clause would require the employer
to take feasible steps to minimize those risks. Failure of an
employer to implement feasible means of abatement of these
hazards could result in the finding of an OSH Act violation.
On the other hand, the occurrence of acts of violence which
are not “recognized” as characteristic of employment and
represent random antisocial acts which may occur anywhere
would not subject the employer to a citation for a violation of
the OSH Act.317
Baroid Div. of NL Indus., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 660 F.2d 439,
445–46 (10th Cir. 1981). But, the general duty clause is not intended to impose absolute liability
nor hold an employer liable on a respondeat superior basis for employee negligence. Getty Oil Co.
v. Occupational Safety & Health Comm’n, 530 F.2d 1143, 1145 (5th Cir. 1976).
313. See Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Comm’n, 489 F.2d
1257, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also Megawest, 1995 OSAHRC LEXIS 80, at *26.
314. Nat’l Realty, 489 F.2d at 1265–66 & n.35. As the Fifth Circuit explained, the general
duty clause is not intended to impose absolute liability nor hold an employer liable on a respondeat
superior basis for an employee’s negligence. Getty Oil, 530 F.2d at 1145.
315. See Letter from Roger A. Clark, Dir., Directorate of Enforcement Programs, Occupational
Safety and Health Admin., to John R. Schuller (Dec. 10, 1992), http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/
owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=20951.
316. See ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1331–32 (N.D. Okla. 2007),
rev’d sub nom. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-5166, 2009 WL 388050 (10th Cir. Feb. 18,
2009).
317. Letter from Roger A. Clark to John R. Schuller, supra note 315 (emphasis added).
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As OSHA also explained, whether an employer faces liability turns on
the specific circumstances of the case.318 In workforces where the risk of
violence is a “recognized hazard” in that industry, the general duty clause
may require an employer to take feasible steps to minimize the risk;
however, this requirement is industry-specific, and there is no evidence
that minimizing risks requires banning guns from all parking lots in all
workplaces everywhere.319
Further, the letter suggests employers will not be liable for complying
with state guns-at-work laws.320 This is because “the feasibility of the
means of abatement [of the hazard is a] critical factor[] to be considered”
for liability.321 Where state law prevents employers from banning guns
from vehicles, employers may find other feasible alternatives to eliminate
the hazard of guns in the workplace. For instance, employers could install
metal detectors at office entrances or sponsor gun awareness programs to
educate employees on the dangers of improper handgun usage.322
Given the presence of other options, it seems unlikely that OSHA
would hold employers liable because they decided, rather than banning
guns in parking lots, to pursue alternative precautions of arguably equal
efficacy. Because alternatives of arguably equivalent efficacy are available,
state laws that prohibit guns in vehicles should not bar fulfillment of the
general-duty-clause obligation to enhance worker safety. Guns-at-work
laws may eliminate one possible way to enhance safety. But, eliminating
one of many means should not obstruct accomplishing the ultimate goal.
The general duty clause does not require banning guns from vehicles as
the only means of ensuring worker safety.323 Employers may
simultaneously ensure worker safety and permit guns in vehicles. Indeed,
permitting guns in vehicles may actually assist employers in enhancing
worker safety. Thus, state guns-at-work laws do not conflict with the
318. Id.
319. See id.; see also Letter from Richard E. Fairfax to Morgan Melekos, supra note 127.
320. Letter from Roger A. Clark to John R. Schuller, supra note 315.
321. Id.; see also Getty Oil Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 530 F.2d
1143, 1145 (5th Cir. 1976) (noting general duty clause requires employers to discover and exclude
from workplace feasibly preventable hazards).
322. See, e.g., Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1975)
(“An employer must take reasonable precautionary steps to protect its employees from reasonably
foreseeable recognized dangers that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical
injury. And precautionary steps, of course, include the employer's providing an adequate safety and
training program.”).
323. See Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1299 (N.D. Fla. 2008)
(“If the failure to ban guns were indeed a violation of the general duty clause, then all businesses
would have a duty to ban guns. One doubts that even the plaintiffs really assert this is the law; they
at least have not done so explicitly in this case. This record makes clear that some businesses
believe guns in parking lots are a danger and wish to ban them. But surely some businesses do not.
By enacting the general duty clause, Congress did not weigh in on this issue.”).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss3/2

48

Royal: Take Your Gun to Work and Leave It in the Parking Lot: Why the OH

2009]

TAKE YOUR GUN TO WORK

523

general duty clause and thus should not be preempted by it.
The Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA, Thomas Stohler,
recently bolstered this position in a letter to then-state Representative Jerry
Ellis, who principally authored Oklahoma’s guns-at-work laws.324 That
letter states that OSHA does not believe that the OSH Act preempts
Oklahoma’s law.325 According to Stohler, since no OSHA standard
governs guns in vehicles, states retain broad authority in this arena.326 This
further bolsters the conclusion that the OSH Act does not preempt state
guns-at-work laws.327
VI. GUNS AT WORK: PREEMPTION REQUIRES A STANDARD
Despite the OSH Act’s preference for occupational health and safety
standards,328 OSHA has not adopted standards governing workplace
violence329 even after specifically considering the issue—including a direct
request to ban guns from the workplace—on multiple occasions.330 OSHA
has strongly suggested that this silence is deliberate because a standard is
not warranted.331
Rather than adopt binding standards, OSHA has issued non-binding
guidelines332 and letters of interpretation.333 To override state guns-at-work
324. See 28(j) Notice of Supplemental Authority Doc. 01017579209, Letter from Thomas M.
Stohler, Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, to
Hon. Jerry Ellis (Jan. 16, 2009), Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-5166, 2009 WL 388050
(10th Cir. Feb. 18, 2009); see also Marie Price, OSHA: Federal act does not pre-empt Oklahoma
gun law, THE JOURNAL RECORD, Jan. 21, 2009, at News.
325. See Letter from Thomas M. Stohler to Jerry Ellis, supra note 324.
326. See id.
327. Whether the federal agency that enforces the federal law believes preemption exists is
important. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 67–68 (2002); see also Hillsborough
County, 471 U.S. at 721 (explaining where Congress has delegated to an agency administration of a
federal program, and the agency has not suggested interference with federal goals, the Court is
reluctant to find preemption). But see Geier, 529 U.S. at 884–85 (cautioning that no formal agency
statement of preemptive intent is necessary before finding conflict preemption).
328. See supra Part III.A and notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
330. See Letter from Roger A. Clark to John R. Schuller, supra note 315; see also Letter from
Richard E. Fairfax to Morgan Melekos, supra note 127.
331. See Letter from Richard E. Fairfax to Morgan Melekos, supra note 127. OSHA recently
bolstered this conclusion. See supra notes 324–26 and accompanying text.
332. See Letter from Richard E. Fairfax to Morgan Melekos, supra note 127; see also U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., Workplace Violence, Possible
Solutions, http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/workplaceviolence/solutions.html (last visited Apr. 19,
2009); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., ALL ABOUT OSHA 13
(2006), http://www.osha.gov/Publications/all_about_OSHA.pdf (“Failure to implement a guideline
is not itself a violation of the OSH Act’s general duty clause.”).
333. See Letter from Roger A. Clark to John R. Schuller, supra note 315; Letter from Richard
E. Fairfax to Morgan Melekos, supra note 127.
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laws without satisfying the process for promulgating standards undermines
the OSH Act—and violates the express dictates of § 18(a). It also upsets
the delicate balance of sovereignty the OSH Act provides for in this
traditionally state-controlled arena. Preemption of guns-at-work laws
therefore first requires the promulgation of standards.
A. The General Duty Clause Does Not Permit Circumventing
Standards
The general duty clause is intended to fill the gap for unrecognized
hazards, not to circumvent standards.334 Permitting the general duty clause
to circumvent standards subverts the OSH Act’s intricate procedure for
promulgating standards, which provides informed decision-making and
notice.335 This procedure enables interested parties to share information
about a proposed rule’s potential effect and about whether the rule is likely
to accomplish its objectives.336 This process and the resulting standards are
preferred to the general duty clause because standards provide notice to
parties who must follow the rules.337 This arrangement enables parties to
govern their conduct on the front end, rather than face liability on the back
end after unknowingly violating the amorphous general duty clause.
B. Standards Strike the Proper Balance of Cooperative
Federalism
Standards strike the proper balance of cooperative federalism embodied
in the OSH Act. They do so by providing states with prior notice that
applying state law to the workplace could violate the OSH Act in certain
circumstances. For guns-at-work laws with exceptions for federal law,338
standards make clear that these exceptions apply and the general laws
should not be enforced against employers. For states without these
exceptions,339 standards may signal a need to enact them. Many states have
already enacted positive law that yields to federal supremacy.340
The state statutory exceptions for federal law apply when federal law
“prohibits” firearm possession.341 Absent a standard, the OSH Act does not
334. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
335. See 29 U.S.C. § 655.
336. See id. § 655(b).
337. See id.
338. See supra Part IV.B; infra app. A.
339. See supra note 190; infra app. A.
340. See supra Parts IV.A., B.; infra app. A.
341. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.251(7)(g) (West 2008) (excepting property upon which
firearm possession is “prohibited” pursuant to federal law); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135(d)(6)
(West 2008) (providing exception where transport of firearms on employers’ premises is
“prohibited” by state or federal law); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.106(2) (West 2008) (permitting a
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appear to prohibit firearm possession in vehicles parked on employer
property. OSHA has had multiple opportunities to promulgate a standard
governing workplace safety.342 A continued failure to do so must be
interpreted as an affirmative decision that regulation of guns in vehicles
should be left to the states, even when those vehicles are at work.343
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 does not preempt state guns-at-work laws. Intense debate continues
to rage over guns in America with the individual right to bear arms
recently gaining constitutional moorings. Courts should not lightly cast
aside state laws absent a standard decreeing guns in vehicles create a
recognized hazard to workplaces. Absent this, states must be able to
continue enacting laws governing the health, welfare, and safety of their
citizens. The Occupational Safety and Health Act requires nothing less.

person, including an employer, to prevent an individual from possessing a firearm on the property
where that individual is “prohibited” by federal law from possessing a firearm); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 32:292.1(D)(1) (2008) (providing the section shall not apply to any property where
possession of firearms is “prohibited” by state or federal law); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-55(4) (West
2008) (stating this section does not authorize a person to store a firearm on any premises where the
possession of firearms is “prohibited” by federal law).
342. See supra notes 228, 324–31 and accompanying text.
343. OSHA has recently recognized this correct conclusion. See supra notes 324–26 and
accompanying text.
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APPENDIX A
State

Relief/
Punishment

Federal
Immunizes Protects
Law
from
Employees
Exception Liability
Only

Alaska

None provided in the
provision.

Yes344

Yes

No

Florida

Damages, injunctive
relief, civil penalties,
“other relief as may
be appropriate,” “all
reasonable personal
costs and losses
suffered,” court costs
and attorney’s fees to
prevailing party. Part
of criminal code.
Action by Attorney
General. Part of
criminal code.

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

None provided in the
provision.

No

No

No

Georgia

Kansas

344. But see supra note 180.
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Kentucky

Louisiana

Minnesota
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Relief/
Punishment

Federal
Immunizes Protects
Law
from
Employees
Exception Liability
Only

Civil liability,
injunction,
“appropriate relief.”
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 527.020 is part of
criminal code.
Civil action for
damages.345

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

None provided in
the provision, but
statute is part of
criminal code.

No

No

No:
Minn. Stat.
Ann § 624.714
(17)(c)

Mississippi

None provided in
the provision.

Yes

Yes

Yes:
Minn. Stat.
Ann
§ 624.714(18)
No

Oklahoma

Damages,
injunction, court
costs, attorneys’
fees, misdemeanor
sanctions,
punishment under
Oklahoma law.
Both Oklahoma
statutes are part of
criminal code.

No

Yes

No

(Not from
Workers’
Comp.)

345. Louisiana’s statute does not provide this expressly, but it necessarily stems from sections
B and C. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:292.1(B)–(C).
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